--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk/v/0.5.7" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk/v/0.5.7.md" package: "@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk" report_status: "published" title: "@dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.5.7" --- # @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 0.5.7 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. Postinstall unconditionally installs first-party skills on the shared .agents/skills control surface and, when existing environment credentials are present, forwards the access token to an unrestricted operator URL before writing remote skills. That is guarded package-owned agent setup plus conditional credential exposure, not a hidden foreign hijack or a fixed exfiltration host. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-27T15:57:18.860Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-27T15:58:43.238Z - **Download time:** 1015 ms - **Static scan time:** 846 ms - **AI review time:** 82516 ms - **Total time:** 84378 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** npm postinstall copies this package's agent skills into the consumer project's .agents/skills/command-center directory. If Main Sequence MCP environment variables are present, it also sends the access token to an operator-chosen HTTP(S) URL and writes the returned skill files under .agents/skills/mainsequence. - **Trigger:** npm postinstall on a non-global install when INIT\_CWD is set; MCP sync also requires the token and endpoint variables and is skipped when COMMAND\_CENTER\_SDK\_MCP\_POSTINSTALL is 0. - **Impact:** Coding agents that load .agents/skills receive these skill instructions. The configured access token can be sent to any http or https host named in the environment. - **Evidence paths:** package.json, cli/postinstall.mjs, cli/install-agent-skills.mjs, cli/install-mcp-skills.mjs, cli/mcp-platform-skills.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-27T15:58:43.238Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The hook copies packaged skill files into a package-owned namespace. It then POSTs JSON-RPC with a Bearer token to the configured MCP URL and installs the validated catalog into a second namespace. - **Rationale:** Postinstall unconditionally installs first-party skills on the shared .agents/skills control surface and, when existing environment credentials are present, forwards the access token to an unrestricted operator URL before writing remote skills. That is guarded package-owned agent setup plus conditional credential exposure, not a hidden foreign hijack or a fixed exfiltration host. - **Files touched:** .agents/skills/command-center, .agents/skills/mainsequence ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** package.json registers a registry postinstall that runs cli/postinstall.mjs., That hook calls installAgentSkills and writes packaged skills under the consumer project .agents/skills/command-center namespace., Unless COMMAND\_CENTER\_SDK\_MCP\_POSTINSTALL is 0, postinstall uses COMMAND\_CENTER\_SDK\_MCP\_URL, MAINSEQUENCE\_MCP\_URL, or MAINSEQUENCE\_ENDPOINT plus MAINSEQUENCE\_ACCESS\_TOKEN., The MCP URL check allows any http or https host, the access token is sent as a Bearer header, and returned skills are written under .agents/skills/mainsequence. - **Evidence against:** Global installs and the SDK source repository are skipped, and MCP failures do not fail the npm install., There is no dependency on this package name, no eval or hidden payload, and no hardcoded exfiltration host., Skill writes stay inside the command-center and mainsequence namespaces and refuse symlink destinations. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7. - Review the evidence and your use of @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.5.7 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node ./cli/postinstall.mjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 5. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 6. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 7. Critical: Ai Agent Control Hijack - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** cli/install-agent-skills.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source creates an unconsented AI-agent control surface through install-time mutation or a default unauthenticated remote skill channel. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Install-time code directly mutates a foreign AI-agent control surface: L377: resolvedProjectDir, L378: ".agents", L379: "skills", ... L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot); L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: true }); L430: const stageRoot = await mkdtemp(join(skillsParent, ".command-center-stage-")); ... L439: const staged = join(stageRoot, ...item.relativePath.split("/")); L440: await mkdir(dirname(staged), { recursive: true }); L441: await cp(item.source, staged, { L442: recursive: true, ... L448: L449: await mkdir(destinationRoot, { recursive: true }); Write operation from cli/install-agent-skills.mjs: L377: resolvedProjectDir, L378: ".agents", L379: "skills", ... L428: const skillsParent = dirname(destinationRoot); L429: await mkdir(skillsParent, { recursive: t ``` ### 8. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 9. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 10. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 11. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** styles.css - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```css stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 7 ``` ### 12. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** cli/application-sdk-maintenance.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.4.1 matchedPath = cli/application-sdk-maintenance.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.4.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 13. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** cli/code-repository-sync-local-ops.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk@0.4.1 matchedPath = cli/code-repository-sync-local-ops.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:0.4.1 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 1 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 2 - **Development dependencies:** 9 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 3 ### Published dependency entries - lucide-react ^0.500.0 (Dependency) - react \>=18 \<20 (PeerDependency) - react-dom \>=18 \<20 (PeerDependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @dev-mainsequence/command-center-sdk - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.5.7 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-27T13:27:44.764Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-08-05T08:43:23.868Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-16T21:00:19.541Z - **Known versions:** 26 - **Latest version:** 0.5.18 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** The framework-neutral SDK for building Command Center-compatible resource applications, navigation, layouts, themes, feedback, and embeds. - **Maintainers:** dev-mainsequence - **Artifact files:** 506 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,935,956 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** Yes - **Provenance:** https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1 ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()