--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dotobokuri/fleet-console" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dotobokuri/fleet-console/v/1.104.1.md" package: "@dotobokuri/fleet-console" report_status: "published" title: "@dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.104.1 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "1.104.1" --- # @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.104.1 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk - **Selected version:** 1.104.1 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. LPM treats this as warn-only first-party agent extension lifecycle risk. The authenticated Skills API can install and update external agent skills at project or global scope. This establishes a guarded extension lifecycle capability, without establishing an active malicious attack. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-30T15:53:00.070Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-30T15:55:58.526Z - **Download time:** 2031 ms - **Static scan time:** 16217 ms - **AI review time:** 160207 ms - **Total time:** 178456 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** The authenticated Skills API can install and update external agent skills at project or global scope. This establishes a guarded extension lifecycle capability, without establishing an active malicious attack. - **Trigger:** An authorized POST request to the Skills install or update operation. - **Impact:** Selected agents can receive external skills, including globally installed skills; updates require a separate authorized request in the inspected handlers. - **Evidence paths:** dist/fleet-plugins/skills/routes.mjs - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-30T15:55:58.526Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The plugin bootstraps an external Skills CLI and executes add or update commands with confirmation skipped and the requested scope. - **Rationale:** Source supports a guarded agent extension lifecycle warning because authenticated operations install and update external skills across project or global agent scopes. It does not support classifying the package as malware or blocking publication. ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** The Skills plugin exposes a POST install operation that selects agents and project or global scope, then adds skills with confirmation skipped., Skills operations require terminal authorization; the install route also declares an origin-write gate., The plugin installs skills@1.5.14 into its own CLI directory and executes that external CLI., A separate POST update operation updates skills with confirmation skipped in the requested scope., Postinstall starts the console only for global installations outside CI, unless an opt-out variable is set. - **Evidence against:** The inspected credential usage requests target the intended Anthropic and ChatGPT services., No covert exfiltration or unconsented install-time mutation of broad agent configuration was established., Skill installation validates the source, skill, scope and selected agents. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.104.1. - Review the evidence and your use of @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.104.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.mjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.mjs ``` ### 3. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 4. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: import { createRequire, builtinModules } from 'node:module'; L9: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L10: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; ``` ### 5. High: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 80.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic code evaluation. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L29814: const payload = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(input), "utf8").toString("base64url"); L29815: const bootstrap = `eval(require('node:zlib').inflateRawSync(Buffer.from(process.argv.splice(1,1)[0],'base64url')).toString('utf8'))`; L29816: const command2 = `node -e "${bootstrap}" ${CURSOR_GREP_RECEIPT_SCRIPT_BASE64} ${payload}`; ``` ### 6. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L39: }; L40: var __commonJS = (cb, mod) => function __require() { L41: return mod || (0, cb[__getOwnPropNames(cb)[0]])((mod = { exports: {} }).exports, mod), mod.exports; ``` ### 7. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 8. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 9. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 10. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L52576: } L52577: async function validateAgentCliPathForSave(executablePath, env = process.env, runVersion = execFileVersion) { L52578: const resolution = validateUserAgentCliPath(executablePath, env); ... L52585: function execFileVersion(bin, args) { L52586: return new Promise((resolve4, reject) => { L52587: execFile( L52588: bin, ``` ### 11. Critical: Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: import { createRequire, builtinModules } from 'node:module'; L9: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L10: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; ... L13: import { promisify, styleText } from 'node:util'; L14: import http2 from 'node:http2'; L15: import { deflateRawSync, inflateRawSync } from 'node:zlib'; L16: import V2, { stdin, stdout } from 'node:process'; L17: import http from 'node:http'; ... L62: )); L63: function getFleetDataDir(env = process.env) { L64: const override = env[FLEET_DATA_DIR_ENV]; L65: if (override === void 0 || override.trim().length === 0) return path64.join(os4.homedir(), FLEET_DATA_DIR_NAME); ``` ### 12. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cli.mjs: import fs40__default, { constants, existsSync, readFileSync, rmSync, rmdirSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync, chmodSync, promises, lstatSync, readdirSync, realpathSync, mkdtempSync, re... import fs11, { mkdir, readdir, readFile, rm, writeFile, open, appendFile, chmod, mkdtemp, rename, stat, unlink } from 'node:fs/promises'; import readline from 'node:readline'; headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${lock.token}` }, fsImpl.writeFileSync(fd, `${JSON.stringify(payload, null, 2)} fs40.writeFileSync(tempPath, content, { encoding: "utf-8", flag: "wx", mode }); fs40.writeFileSync(ownerPath, JSON.stringify(owner), { encoding: "utf-8", m ``` ### 13. Critical: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source executes local commands and sends command output to an external endpoint. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L59733: function verifyMacWindowIdentity(target2) { L59734: return new Promise((resolve4) => { L59735: execFile("/usr/bin/osascript", ["-l", "JavaScript", "-e", WINDOW_IDENTITY, "verify", String(target2.pid), String(target2.windowId), String(target2.processStartedAt)], { timeout: 3e... L59736: }); ... L59741: if (error51) { L59742: process.stderr.write(`[fleet-computer-use] window identity unavailable: ${/window_accessibility_-25211/.test(error51.message) ? "accessibility_permission_required" : "window_lookup... L59743: `); ``` ### 14. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L8: import { createRequire, builtinModules } from 'node:module'; L9: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L10: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; ... L13: import { promisify, styleText } from 'node:util'; L14: import http2 from 'node:http2'; L15: import { deflateRawSync, inflateRawSync } from 'node:zlib'; L16: import V2, { stdin, stdout } from 'node:process'; L17: import http from 'node:http'; ... L62: )); L63: function getFleetDataDir(env = process.env) { L64: const override = env[FLEET_DATA_DIR_ENV]; L65: if (override === void 0 || override.trim().length === 0) return path64.join(os4.homedir(), FLEET_DATA_DIR_NAME); ``` ### 15. High: Cross File Remote Execution Context - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 72.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.mjs spawns dist/fleet-plugins/codex/routes.mjs; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L6: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; L7: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import { performance as performance$1 } from 'node:perf_hooks'; ... L13: import os3__default, { tmpdir, homedir } from 'node:os'; L14: import net from 'node:net'; L15: import tls from 'node:tls'; ... L20: import http2 from 'node:http2'; L21: import { deflateRawSync, inflateRawSync } from 'node:zlib'; L22: import { tool, createSdkMcpServer, query, getSessionInfo } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk'; ... L56: const resolved = findBinaryPath(command2, env, options); L57: return resolved ? wrapWindowsShim(r ``` ### 16. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.mjs L6: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; L7: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import { performance as performance$1 } from 'node:perf_hooks'; ... L13: import os3__default, { tmpdir, homedir } from 'node:os'; L14: import net from 'node:net'; L15: import tls from 'node:tls'; ... L20: import http2 from 'node:http2'; L21: import { deflateRawSync, inflateRawSync } from 'node:zlib'; L22: import { tool, createSdkMcpServer, query, getSessionInfo } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk'; ... L56: const resolved = findBinaryPath(command2, env, options); L57: return resolved ? wrapWindowsShim(resolved, env, options.platform ?? process.platform) : void 0; L58: } ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.mjs L6: import { fileURLToPath, pathToFileURL } from 'node:url'; L7: import { execFile, spawn, execFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; L8: import { performance as performance$1 } from 'node:perf_hooks'; ... L13: import os3__default, { tmpdir, homedir } from 'node:os'; L14: import net from 'node:net'; L15: import tls from 'node:tls'; ... L20: import http2 from 'node:http2'; L21: import { deflateRawSync, inflateRawSync } from 'node:zlib'; L22: import { tool, createSdkMcpServer, query, getSessionInfo } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk'; ... L56: const resolved = findBinaryPath(command2, env, options); L57: return resolved ? wrapWindowsShim(resolved, env, options.platform ?? process.platform) : void 0; L58: } ``` ### 18. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.main -> dist/cli.mjs L56874: function verifyMacWindowIdentity(target2) { L56875: return new Promise((resolve4) => { L56876: execFile("/usr/bin/osascript", ["-l", "JavaScript", "-e", WINDOW_IDENTITY, "verify", String(target2.pid), String(target2.windowId), String(target2.processStartedAt)], { timeout: 3e... L56877: }); ... L56882: if (error51) { L56883: process.stderr.write(`[fleet-computer-use] window identity unavailable: ${/window_accessibility_-25211/.test(error51.message) ? "accessibility_permission_required" : "window_lookup... L56884: `); ``` ### 19. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 20. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 21. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 22. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 23. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 24. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/fleet-plugins/skills/routes.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.90.0 matchedPath = dist/fleet-plugins/skills/routes.mjs matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.90.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 25. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/client/assets/chunk-OYMX7WX6-CCxR5\_Ut.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.90.0 matchedPath = dist/client/assets/chunk-OYMX7WX6-DdYYHE30.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.90.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 26. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/client/assets/diagram-G4DWMVQ6-B2yl4iQ3.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.90.0 matchedPath = dist/client/assets/diagram-G4DWMVQ6-6pi0pIEd.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.90.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 27. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/client/assets/flowDiagram-DWJPFMVM-IFU2zsbI.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.90.0 matchedPath = dist/client/assets/flowDiagram-DWJPFMVM-Dz5wLJVG.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.90.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 28. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/client/assets/wardleyDiagram-NUSXRM2D-CEL5xQwX.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.90.0 matchedPath = [redacted]-NUSXRM2D-0zWurJwJ.js matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.90.0 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 29. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/cli.mjs - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @dotobokuri/fleet-console@1.204.0 matchedIdentity = npm:[redacted]:1.204.0 similarity = 0.886 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall - **Dependencies:** 10 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 21 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 10 ### Published dependency entries - @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk ^0.3.269 (Dependency) - @modelcontextprotocol/sdk 1.30.0 (Dependency) - @vscode/ripgrep 1.18.0 (Dependency) - esbuild 0.27.7 (Dependency) - fflate 0.8.2 (Dependency) - font-list ^2.1.0 (Dependency) - node-pty ^1.0.0 (Dependency) - selfsigned ^5.5.0 (Dependency) - tar 7.5.22 (Dependency) - ws ^8.18.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @dotobokuri/fleet-console - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 1.104.1 - **Version published:** 2026-09-21T02:41:33.501Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-02T16:11:45.826Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-01T05:15:13.350Z - **Known versions:** 76 - **Latest version:** 1.204.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Fleet Console — sole owner of the fleet and fleet-console bins, Console web surface, and thin Claude Code launcher. - **Maintainers:** dotobokuri - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20.19.0 - **Artifact files:** 223 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 25,950,630 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]() - [Homepage]() - [Issues]()