@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.5.19
CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe forced global command replacement is an unconsented destructive install-time side effect, but source evidence does not establish credential theft, remote payload execution, or AI-agent control-surface mutation during installation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- install.js postinstall deletes an existing global `bohr` link owned by another package.
- install.js replaces that link with its own run.js symlink without user confirmation.
- bin/bohr-linux-amd64 contains user-invoked skills sync/install support for Codex, Agents, Claude, and Cursor targets.
- package.json has no dependencies or remote install-time download.
- install.js only selects/chmods its bundled platform binary plus the global-bin mutation.
- run.js only executes the matching bundled binary with user-supplied arguments.
- No credential harvesting, exfiltration, eval, or AI-agent writes occur in the JavaScript lifecycle code.
Source & flagged code
3 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.5.19.
See all versions of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.5.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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