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@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67: Malicious npm security report | LPM Firewall

registry / @dptech-corp/bohr-cli / 2.6.67

@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67

CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform

AI Security Review

scanned 22d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installing the package automatically downloads executable companion tools and writes them into ~/.bohr/tools. One payload URL and its optional hash are controlled by remote release metadata.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source

Trigger

npm postinstall during package installation.

Impact

A compromised or malicious release response can persist an executable payload that may run as a companion tool.

Mechanism

Remote binary download, permission change, and home-directory installation.

Attack narrative

On installation, the postinstall hook contacts vendor endpoints, obtains remote metadata, follows redirects, and stores downloaded binaries in the user home directory with executable permissions. The wenyon path trusts a remotely supplied URL and accepts the binary if the response has no sha256 field. The trisol checksum comes from the same service as its binary. This creates an automatic remote-payload installation path outside the npm artifact.

AI rationale

This package creates an unconsented install-time remote binary delivery and persistence path with no independent integrity verification. The absence of secret harvesting does not mitigate that concrete lifecycle payload risk.

Evidence

package.jsonpostinstall.js~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/current/wenyon-cli~/.bohr/tools/trisol/current/trisol~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/manifest.yaml~/.bohr/tools/trisol/manifest.yaml

Source & flagged code

10 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

postinstall.jsView file

•matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.100 matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.100 similarity = 0.500 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file

Critical

Previous Version Dangerous Delta

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

postinstall.jsView on unpkg

189try { L190: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process"); L191: const out = execFileSync(destPath, ["version"], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5000 });

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L189

8*/ L9: const https = require("https"); L10: const http = require("http"); ... L16: const WENYON_SERVER = "https://wenyon.dp.tech"; L17: const WENYON_ROOT = path.join(os.homedir(), ".bohr", "tools", "wenyon"); L18: const INSTALL_DIR = path.join(WENYON_ROOT, "current"); ... L22: // env (e.g. https://trisol-dev.dp.tech + channel dev). L23: const TRISOL_SERVER = process.env.BOHR_TRISOL_SERVER || "https://trisol.dp.tech"; L24: const TRISOL_ROOT = path.join(os.homedir(), ".bohr", "tools", "trisol"); ... L31: try { L32: return JSON.parse(text).pinned_hash || ""; L33: } catch (_) {

High

Install Named Payload File

Install-named source file stages remote content through filesystem writes and execution.

postinstall.jsView on unpkg · L8

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71 matchedPath = postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

postinstall.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = f24ff18aa4cad53e signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71 matchedPath = postinstall.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 2 summary = package final verdict is malicious

High

Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

postinstall.jsView on unpkg

run.jsView file

64`package managers do this without reporting an error)`, L65: "npm install -g @dptech-corp/bohr-cli --force" L66: ); ... L69: try { L70: execFileSync(binaryPath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: "inherit" }); L71: } catch (e) {

High

Runtime Package Install

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

run.jsView on unpkg · L64

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71 matchedPath = run.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

run.jsView on unpkg

run.js#virtual:normalized:round1View file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

run.js#virtual:normalized:round1View on unpkg