---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli/v/2.6.67"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli/v/2.6.67.md"
package: "@dptech-corp/bohr-cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67 npm security report"
verdict: "malicious"
version: "2.6.67"
---

# @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Blocked & quarantined** — A compromised or malicious release response can persist an executable payload that may run as a companion tool.

- **Verdict:** Malicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Block
- **Firewall policy:** Matched malicious
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Install Hook Abuse
- **Selected version:** 2.6.67
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: malicious; recommendation: publish block. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Installing the package automatically downloads executable companion tools and writes them into ~/.bohr/tools. One payload URL and its optional hash are controlled by remote release metadata.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Malicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-16T07:53:14.679Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-16T07:53:58.691Z
- **Download time:** 1020 ms
- **Static scan time:** 47 ms
- **AI review time:** 42944 ms
- **Total time:** 44012 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Installing the package automatically downloads executable companion tools and writes them into ~/.bohr/tools. One payload URL and its optional hash are controlled by remote release metadata.

- **Trigger:** npm postinstall during package installation.

- **Impact:** A compromised or malicious release response can persist an executable payload that may run as a companion tool.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, postinstall.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-16T07:53:58.691Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Remote binary download, permission change, and home-directory installation.

- **Attack narrative:** On installation, the postinstall hook contacts vendor endpoints, obtains remote metadata, follows redirects, and stores downloaded binaries in the user home directory with executable permissions. The wenyon path trusts a remotely supplied URL and accepts the binary if the response has no sha256 field. The trisol checksum comes from the same service as its binary. This creates an automatic remote-payload installation path outside the npm artifact.

- **Rationale:** This package creates an unconsented install-time remote binary delivery and persistence path with no independent integrity verification. The absence of secret harvesting does not mitigate that concrete lifecycle payload risk.

- **Files touched:** ~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/current/wenyon-cli, ~/.bohr/tools/trisol/current/trisol, ~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/manifest.yaml, ~/.bohr/tools/trisol/manifest.yaml

- **Network endpoints:** https://wenyon.dp.tech, https://trisol.dp.tech

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Malicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** publish\_block

- **Intent class:** Malware

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for block:** The manifest runs postinstall automatically., Postinstall fetches a release manifest and binary URL from the network., The downloaded wenyon binary is accepted without a hash when metadata omits one, then made executable and installed under the home directory., The trisol hash is obtained from the same network service that supplies the binary, so it does not provide an independent trust boundary.

- **Evidence against:** The inspected JavaScript does not harvest credentials, environment secrets, or project files., The launcher only resolves and executes the matching optional platform package.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67.

- Avoid installing @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/postinstall.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L189: try {
L190: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process");
L191: const out = execFileSync(destPath, ["version"], { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 5000 });
```

### 5. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 6. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 7. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 8. High: Install Named Payload File
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/postinstall.js>)

Install-named source file stages remote content through filesystem writes and execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L8: */
L9: const https = require("https");
L10: const http = require("http");
...
L16: const WENYON_SERVER = "https://wenyon.dp.tech";
L17: const WENYON_ROOT = path.join(os.homedir(), ".bohr", "tools", "wenyon");
L18: const INSTALL_DIR = path.join(WENYON_ROOT, "current");
...
L22: // env (e.g. https://trisol-dev.dp.tech + channel dev).
L23: const TRISOL_SERVER = process.env.BOHR_TRISOL_SERVER || "https://trisol.dp.tech";
L24: const TRISOL_ROOT = path.join(os.homedir(), ".bohr", "tools", "trisol");
...
L31: try {
L32: return JSON.parse(text).pinned_hash || "";
L33: } catch (_) {
```

### 9. High: Runtime Package Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** run.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/run.js>)

Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L64: `package managers do this without reporting an error)`,
L65: "npm install -g @dptech-corp/bohr-cli --force"
L66: );
...
L69: try {
L70: execFileSync(binaryPath, process.argv.slice(2), { stdio: "inherit" });
L71: } catch (e) {
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** run.js\#virtual:normalized:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/run.js%23virtual%3Anormalized%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

### 14. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/postinstall.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71
matchedPath = postinstall.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 15. High: Known Malware Source Similarity
- **Category:** Static
- **Confidence:** 97.0%
- **Path:** run.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/run.js>)

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = normalized_sha256
matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71
matchedPath = run.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71
similarity = 1.000
summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source
```

### 16. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/postinstall.js>)

Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature
signature = f24ff18aa4cad53e
signatureType = suspicious_hashes
sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious
matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71
matchedPath = postinstall.js
matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.71
similarity = 1.000
shingleOverlap = 2
summary = package final verdict is malicious
```

### 17. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 93.0%
- **Path:** postinstall.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.67/postinstall.js>)

This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta
matchedPackage = @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.100
matchedIdentity = npm:QGRwdGVjaC1jb3JwL2JvaHItY2xp:2.6.100
similarity = 0.500
summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 6
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 6

### Published dependency entries
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-darwin-amd64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-darwin-arm64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-linux-amd64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-linux-arm64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-windows-amd64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)
- @dptech-corp/bohr-cli-windows-arm64 2.6.67 (OptionalDependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @dptech-corp/bohr-cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 2.6.67
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-08-28T16:52:44.986Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-07-10T08:28:53.357Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-09-30T17:01:18.869Z
- **Known versions:** 80
- **Latest version:** 2.7.11
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform
- **Author:** DP Technology
- **Keywords:** bohrium, scientific-computing, cli, paper-search, molecular-dynamics
- **Supported OS:** darwin, linux, win32
- **Supported CPU:** x64, arm64
- **Artifact files:** 5
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 122,109 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@dptech-corp/bohr-cli/v/2.6.67>)
