registry / @dptech-corp/bohr-cli / 2.6.71

@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71

CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform

AI Security Review

scanned 3h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Installing the package downloads companion executables to the user's .bohr directory. Subsequent install runs execute a previously downloaded binary.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

npm installation invokes postinstall; a later npm installation finds and runs the stored companion binary.

Impact

A service selected through an environment variable or redirect can supply code that is later executed during package installation.

Mechanism

Configurable remote binary staging followed by automatic execution.

Attack narrative

The postinstall hook selects a trisol server from BOHR_TRISOL_SERVER, follows redirects while downloading a binary, and stores it under ~/.bohr. On a later installation it invokes that stored binary with child_process. The hash is fetched from the same remote service and therefore does not provide an independently pinned trust boundary. Wenyon follows the same remote-download pattern and permits a metadata response without a hash.

Rationale

This is an automatic install-time remote code staging chain with later execution, not merely a user-invoked CLI action. The narrow .bohr destination and lack of secret harvesting reduce scope but do not remove the unconsented lifecycle execution risk.

Evidence

package.jsonpostinstall.js~/.bohr/tools/trisol/current/trisol~/.bohr/tools/trisol/manifest.yaml~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/current/wenyon-cli~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/manifest.yaml

Network endpoints2

@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.71

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Source & flagged code