@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.95
CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is a staged remote-payload carrier because installation automatically installs executable content not present in the reviewed archive. The code has integrity checks and no direct credential theft or destructive behavior, so the evidence does not establish malicious intent.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
npm runs postinstall during package installation.
Impact
A compromised or changed release service can supply a future executable outside this package review boundary; it is installed for later use.
Mechanism
Remote binary download, hash check, chmod, and installation under .bohr.
AI rationale
The package is a staged remote-payload carrier because installation automatically installs executable content not present in the reviewed archive. The code has integrity checks and no direct credential theft or destructive behavior, so the evidence does not establish malicious intent.
Evidence
package.jsonpostinstall.js~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/current/wenyon-cli~/.bohr/tools/trisol/current/trisol~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/manifest.yaml~/.bohr/tools/trisol/manifest.yaml
Network endpoints2
wenyon.dp.techtrisol.dp.tech
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The install lifecycle automatically runs postinstall.
- Postinstall fetches companion-tool metadata and binaries from remote servers.
- It writes downloaded executables under the user's home directory and marks them executable.
- The remote payload is not included in the reviewed package; its hash is supplied by the same remote release flow.
Evidence against
- The launcher only resolves a platform package and executes its declared binary when the user runs bohr.
- No source code harvests credentials, reads sensitive files, or sends environment values to a server.
- Downloaded files are SHA-256 checked before installation, and download failures are skipped.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgrun.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process");
L3: const path = require("path");
High
64
Findings
1 Critical5 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltapostinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processrun.js
HighRuntime Package Installrun.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedrun.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityrun.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.95.
See all versions of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.95 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.