@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.97
CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform
AI Security Review
scanned 1mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic lifecycle installer stages remote executables outside the npm package, so it warrants a warning. The code scopes writes to its own tool area and verifies hashes, and no concrete malicious chain, broad agent-control mutation, or self-dependent lifecycle chain was found.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
npm installation invokes the postinstall lifecycle script.
Impact
A compromise or malicious response from the configured release services can stage a future executable outside the package snapshot.
Mechanism
Remote binary download, hash check, and executable staging.
AI rationale
The automatic lifecycle installer stages remote executables outside the npm package, so it warrants a warning. The code scopes writes to its own tool area and verifies hashes, and no concrete malicious chain, broad agent-control mutation, or self-dependent lifecycle chain was found.
Evidence
package.jsonpostinstall.js~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/current/wenyon-cli~/.bohr/tools/wenyon/manifest.yaml~/.bohr/tools/trisol/current/trisol~/.bohr/tools/trisol/manifest.yaml
Network endpoints2
wenyon.dp.techtrisol.dp.tech
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 90.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The package runs postinstall.js automatically after installation.
- Postinstall downloads server-selected companion binaries and writes them under the user's .bohr directory.
- Downloaded files are made executable, creating a staged payload that is not included in the npm package.
- The WENYON release response supplies the binary URL and hash at install time.
Evidence against
- The installer requires a SHA-256 value and rejects a mismatched download.
- Writes are limited to package-owned .bohr tool directories and manifests.
- The launcher only executes the platform package binary after the user invokes bohr.
- No credential collection, secret exfiltration, self-dependency, or destructive project mutation was found.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcepackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node postinstall.js
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgrun.jsView file
1#!/usr/bin/env node
L2: const { execFileSync } = require("child_process");
L3: const path = require("path");
High
64
Findings
1 Critical5 High4 Medium4 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltapostinstall.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processrun.js
HighRuntime Package Installrun.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limitedrun.js#virtual:normalized:round1
HighKnown Malware Source Similarityrun.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowScripts Present
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.97.
See all versions of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.6.97 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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