@dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.7.19
CLI tool for Bohrium scientific computing platform
AI Security Review
scanned 9d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic executable download and staging create a real supply-chain exposure, while same-service hash verification and the lack of install-time execution do not establish an attack. Classify as suspicious and warn.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs postinstall.js automatically during installation.
- The postinstall script downloads companion executables and stages them under the user's .bohr tools directory.
- The Trisol manifest and expected hash come from the configured Trisol server.
- The installer checks the downloaded file against that expected hash before making it executable.
- The CLI launcher runs the matching platform binary with the caller's arguments.
- A hash mismatch causes the downloaded file to be deleted and installation to be skipped.
- The inspected JavaScript does not execute the downloaded companion binaries during postinstall.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgThe package runs postinstall.js automatically during installation.
package.jsonView on unpkg · L9Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.7.19.
See all versions of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @dptech-corp/bohr-cli@2.7.19 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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