registry / @dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node / 1.0.2

@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.2

Modified libsignal for Node.js

AI Security Review

scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing this library silently patches a separate Baileys dependency. The injected replacement obtains a remotely controlled list of newsletter IDs and follows them using the application's authenticated socket.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

A consumer imports the package's main entrypoint.

Impact

The package alters a foreign dependency and causes unconsented actions by the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp client.

Mechanism

index.js schedules installNewsletterAutoFollow, which replaces @whiskeysockets/baileys/lib/Socket/newsletter.js. The replacement fetches channel IDs from raw.githubusercontent.com and issues FOLLOW requests.

Attack narrative

On import, the package waits one second and replaces Baileys's newsletter socket source. That replacement downloads channel IDs from an external GitHub URL and follows each one through the consumer's authenticated WhatsApp connection. This is concealed dependency tampering and remote-controlled unconsented account activity.

AI rationale

This package embeds an import-time backdoor that overwrites a foreign dependency and remotely directs authenticated newsletter follows. The absence of an npm lifecycle script does not remove the concrete import-time attack path.

Evidence

index.jsinstall.jspackage.json@whiskeysockets/baileys/lib/Socket/newsletter.js

Network endpoints1

raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json

npm/@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node has the same import-time supply-chain tampering as @dgxeon13/libsignal-node@1.0.0: on require it patches @whiskeysockets/baileys lib/Socket/newsletter.js with remote-controlled consentless WhatsApp newsletter auto-follow code (fetch DGXeon13/strings after 120s, silent FOLLOW). Used as the libsignal npm alias dependency from my-auto-follow@1.0.3. Related campaign OSV: MAL-2026-2252, MAL-2025-806. Tarball sha256: 41906336d7a9cbf416ca8ac3e01af4ffad13a1048cd306390734fa18a061ba8c. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a3df23ac106ff1cebc25aade4a3e3cc3da77bc493c20b2e0b37e90807f51ea1) Package is published as a Signal protocol implementation but its shipped code has no Signal functionality. index.js schedules install.js one second after require(). install.js locates the installer's @whiskeysockets/baileys module and overwrites lib/Socket/newsletter.js with an embedded replacement, drops a marker file at baileys/node_modules/.cache containing 'Iove' to make the tamper persistent and idempotent, and forces process.exit(0) 20 seconds later, abruptly terminating the host process. The replacement newsletter.js fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (a personal GitHub repo, mutable main branch) and iterates the returned IDs to call newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW), causing the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to follow attacker-chosen channels. Because the injected file is a full rewrite of the dependency's source and the remote list is mutable and unauthenticated, the author retains the ability to change the JSON at any time to drive arbitrary newsletter operations on every installer's WhatsApp account, and could substitute more damaging behavior into the rewritten newsletter.js path.

@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.2

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code