registry / @dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node / 1.0.3

@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.3

Modified libsignal for Node.js

AI Security Review

scanned 17d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

Importing this package silently modifies a third-party Baileys module. The replacement later obtains remote channel IDs and causes the user's authenticated WhatsApp client to follow them.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source fingerprint signature matched known malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

A consumer imports the package entrypoint.

Impact

An attacker can make an authenticated WhatsApp client follow operator-selected channels and persist the altered dependency file.

Mechanism

index.js schedules the installer, which replaces Baileys's newsletter.js with code that fetches a remote list and calls the follow operation for every listed channel.

Attack narrative

A normal import triggers an installer without user action. It locates Baileys, replaces its newsletter implementation, and marks the modification in that dependency's node_modules directory. The injected implementation downloads channel IDs from the publisher-controlled URL and follows them through the existing authenticated socket after a delay. This is a covert, remotely controlled alteration of a foreign dependency and misuse of the consumer's WhatsApp session.

AI rationale

The package contains a concrete import-time backdoor that mutates a third-party dependency and remotely directs authenticated account actions. The absence of an npm lifecycle hook does not remove the automatic import-time attack path.

Evidence

index.jsinstall.js

Network endpoints1

raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json

npm/@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node has the same import-time supply-chain tampering as @dgxeon13/libsignal-node@1.0.0: on require it patches @whiskeysockets/baileys lib/Socket/newsletter.js with remote-controlled consentless WhatsApp newsletter auto-follow code (fetch DGXeon13/strings after 120s, silent FOLLOW). Used as the libsignal npm alias dependency from my-auto-follow@1.0.3. Related campaign OSV: MAL-2026-2252, MAL-2025-806. Tarball sha256: 41906336d7a9cbf416ca8ac3e01af4ffad13a1048cd306390734fa18a061ba8c. --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (4a3df23ac106ff1cebc25aade4a3e3cc3da77bc493c20b2e0b37e90807f51ea1) Package is published as a Signal protocol implementation but its shipped code has no Signal functionality. index.js schedules install.js one second after require(). install.js locates the installer's @whiskeysockets/baileys module and overwrites lib/Socket/newsletter.js with an embedded replacement, drops a marker file at baileys/node_modules/.cache containing 'Iove' to make the tamper persistent and idempotent, and forces process.exit(0) 20 seconds later, abruptly terminating the host process. The replacement newsletter.js fetches https://raw.githubusercontent.com/DGXeon13/strings/refs/heads/main/strings.json (a personal GitHub repo, mutable main branch) and iterates the returned IDs to call newsletterWMexQuery(id, QueryIds.FOLLOW), causing the installer's authenticated WhatsApp session to follow attacker-chosen channels. Because the injected file is a full rewrite of the dependency's source and the remote list is mutable and unauthenticated, the author retains the ability to change the JSON at any time to drive arbitrary newsletter operations on every installer's WhatsApp account, and could substitute more damaging behavior into the rewritten newsletter.js path.

@dreamguyxeon/libsignal-node@1.0.3

AI Security Review

OSV advisory

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code