@echomem/mcp@1.4.51
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has no install lifecycle scripts, and its self-runtime installation explicitly uses npm with scripts disabled. Agent hooks and configuration changes are reachable through explicit setup commands rather than package installation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has no install lifecycle hook; it exposes a CLI entry point.
- Configuration writes are reached only through explicit init, setup, or update commands.
- The durable runtime installer fetches this package by exact version with lifecycle scripts disabled.
- Durable re-execution occurs only when an explicit configuration command runs from an npx cache.
- Hook configuration is installed by setup logic and targets EchoMem commands.
- The HUD binds locally and sends session content only through its authenticated renewal action.
- No package-install-time execution or unconsented agent-control-surface mutation was found.
- No credential harvesting, arbitrary command execution, or stealthy exfiltration path was confirmed.
Source & flagged code
9 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.51.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.51 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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