@echomem/mcp@1.4.55
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook and no confirmed attack. Agent hook writes are tied to CLI setup behavior, while the reviewed data handling concerns local session files.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines build and prepack scripts, with no install lifecycle hook; the executable entrypoint is dist/index.js.
- Agent hooks are added to detected Codex or Claude Code profiles by setup code, and the CLI runs those actions through explicit subcommands.
- The hook writes invoke EchoMem commands, and the inspected HUD and scorer locations read local session metadata or files.
- The runtime updater installs a versioned EchoMem runtime; the inspected server code reads local Codex session data.
- The inspected source locations show no confirmed credential disclosure to an unrelated recipient or unconsented install-time agent configuration change.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.55.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.55 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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