@echomem/mcp@1.4.58
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook or confirmed malicious credential transfer. Agent configuration changes are tied to CLI setup, while the flagged process and session-file operations support local product functions.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest contains build, CLI, test, and prepack scripts, with no npm install lifecycle hook.
- Setup sends the supplied EchoMem token to the EchoMem API default and stores it locally; the API base can be configured through an environment variable.
- Agent hook configuration is written by the CLI setup flow, which can disable save hooks, and the hook installer merges EchoMem hooks into existing settings.
- The flagged session-file paths are used for local session discovery or display; the inspected excerpts show no credential transfer from them.
- The runtime bootstrap is limited to an ephemeral npx copy and installs the same package version with npm scripts disabled.
- The HUD’s inspected child process call invokes sqlite3 with a database path and query.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.58.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.58 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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