@echomem/mcp@1.4.60
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no install lifecycle hook or concrete attack behavior. The flagged agent integration and credential handling are consistent with explicit EchoMem setup and authentication to its configured service.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest has no preinstall, install, or postinstall hook; its listed scripts are development, build, and test commands.
- The scorer assets inspect local Codex session files, while the monitor reads the Codex session index and migration code filters for user-created sessions.
- Agent setup is performed through the explicit init command; login is deferred until onboarding, and the Codex hook writes a local summary command to the agent's hooks file.
- Login uses the EchoMem API base URL, defaults to the EchoMem host, and uses the resulting device token for API authentication.
- Durable runtime setup is guarded against recursion and can be disabled; the HUD server streams monitor state to connected local clients.
- No inspected source established an unrelated credential recipient, an install-triggered agent configuration change, or another concrete attack.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.60.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.60 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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