@echomem/mcp@1.4.61
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found no package install hook and no confirmed attack behavior. Agent hook configuration is written through the setup flow for detected clients, while the inspected network and local process behavior is consistent with the package’s memory bridge functions.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json defines no install lifecycle hook; the prepack script only builds the package.
- The setup CLI installs EchoMem hooks for detected Codex or Claude Code clients when setup runs; the hook module exposes these as explicit functions.
- The hooks target configured Codex and Claude settings locations and add EchoMem checkpoint behavior.
- Setup uses the EchoMem API endpoint by default, and the HUD child processes shown query local SQLite data or open a link.
- The remaining cited files inspect local session paths, configured profile directories, and EchoMem runtime setup.
- Setup can write EchoMem hooks into agent configuration, and the runtime can stage an EchoMem package release; these actions are tied to setup or runtime update flows.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.61.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.61 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.