@echomem/mcp@1.4.65
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiDirect source inspection found no npm install hook or confirmed attack. The credential flow authenticates to the configured EchoMem API, while agent setup and hook installation occur through the CLI setup path.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no install lifecycle hook; its prepack script only runs the build.
- The scorer, monitor, and migration excerpts read local Codex session or index data.
- Agent guidance and hooks are installed by CLI setup; server startup refreshes only an existing EchoMem-owned guidance block.
- Login obtains an EchoMem device token through the configured EchoMem API; authenticated requests use that same API base. No saved third-party credential transfer was established.
- The managed runtime installs this package into its own directory with npm scripts disabled.
- The HUD excerpt invokes sqlite3 with execFileSync against a local Codex database; it does not invoke a shell.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.65.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.65 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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