@echomem/mcp@1.4.68
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 19d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest has no install lifecycle hook, and inspected credential requests use the package’s EchoMem API base. The flagged configuration writes are EchoMem hook setup; the inspected source did not establish unconsented lifecycle mutation or another concrete attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json has no install lifecycle hook; its prepack script only builds the package.
- The flagged asset and monitor locations read local Codex session data or project files; they do not show agent configuration writes.
- The flagged migration and setup locations contain profile-path handling, not credential forwarding or lifecycle-triggered agent mutation.
- The durable runtime and HUD server use child processes for package runtime and local server functions; the inspected excerpts show no attack behavior.
- Setup sends bearer credentials to the EchoMem API base, which defaults to the EchoMem service; the inspected setup excerpt receives a device token through its callback.
- HUD hook code writes EchoMem-labeled hooks into user configuration, and the inspected entrypoint routes CLI subcommands separately from serving.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.68.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.68 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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