@echomem/mcp@1.4.71
EchoMem MCP bridge for cross-agent memory, local history import, and recall
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThis is intentional runtime telemetry, but the package README does not disclose it, so it warrants a warning. The inspected events contain usage and installation identifiers rather than credentials, file contents, or other sensitive machine data.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package sends CLI and onboarding funnel analytics to PostHog when users run setup or login flows; the package README does not disclose this telemetry.
- Events include the command and may include configured host IDs and import session counts, in addition to platform and version data.
- The analytics code uses a random installation ID and, after sign-in, an Echo account ID; the inspected fields do not include credentials or file contents.
- Users can disable telemetry with ECHO_TELEMETRY, ECHO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY, or DO_NOT_TRACK.
- No install lifecycle scripts are declared; analytics runs during CLI commands and onboarding flows.
- The setup API defaults to EchoMem’s API, and the bearer token is sent to that configured API endpoint.
- The telemetry code filters sensitive fields and normalizes errors before sending them.
Source & flagged code
7 flaggedPackage source references child process execution.
dist/durable-entry.jsView on unpkg · L1Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @echomem/mcp@1.4.71.
See all versions of @echomem/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @echomem/mcp@1.4.71 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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