@emcd-vue/auth@6.4.5

Part of a coordinated multi-package supply-chain attack impersonating EMCD (emcd.io), a legitimate Russian cryptocurrency exchange and mining pool. The attacker registered the `@emcd-vue` npm scope to pose as an internal Vue.js front-end tooling package from "EMCD Platform Engineering." The package contains no functional library code — the entire package is a delivery vehicle for a multi-stage dropper embedded in a 137.5 KB single-line obfuscated postinstall hook (JScrambler/WaCk-style; 811-element encoded string array). **Trigger:** `scripts.postinstall` → `scripts/postinstall.js` **Execution flow:** - Checks `EMCD_VUE_NO_TELEMETRY` env var as a kill-switch (README misleadingly documents a different, non-functional kill-switch name) - Computes a per-host/project dedup key to execute only once - Detects platform (`linux-x64`, `darwin-arm64`, `win`) - Downloads platform-specific second-stage: `GET https://oob.moika.tech/payload/{platform}` with `X-Secret: l95HdDaz3kQx1Zsg3WxH6HvKANf51RY1` - Writes payload to `~/.emcd-vue_init.js` (dot-prefixed hidden file) - Spawns payload as a detached, unref'd process — persists after npm exits - Beacons installation metadata to `https://oob.moika.tech/report` --- ## Source: amazon-inspector (f8bc285b34b9a2e8abc8e2a86a7a0c8738823d504bbc7e30a4e56b1ec9810162) @emcd-vue/auth@6.4.5 is a hollow shell package whose only functional content is a malicious postinstall script. package.json advertises this as an 'Internal @wildberries/service-router package' (a dependency-confusion lure targeting builds that expect an internal @wildberries/* mirror), but dist/index.js is a one-line re-export `module.exports = require('../src/index.js')` pointing at a path that does not exist in the tarball — the package provides no library functionality. scripts/postinstall.js is heavily obfuscated using an obfuscator.io-style shuffled string array with RC4 + base64 decoders and hex-encoded property accesses; critical strings (host, URL path, secret header) are assembled only at runtime via `atob(...)+atob(...)` concatenation to evade static inspection. On `npm install` the script issues an HTTPS GET with a custom `X-Secret` header to the runtime-assembled URL, writes the response buffer to a randomly-named.js file under `os.tmpdir()`, and spawns it with `process.execPath` (Node) detached, `stdio:'ignore'`, `windowsHide:true`, then `.unref()`s the child so it survives the installer. Host-identifying data is exfiltrated as part of the fetch (hostname-keyed string selection via `os.hostname()`, CWD walk-up via `process.cwd()`, Node version check), and the spawned child receives the installer's full `process.env` plus additional atob-decoded secret values, handing any environment-resident credentials to the attacker-controlled payload.