@ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.10.0
Admin UI for Ensi admin panel
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic postinstall changes agent configuration across three ecosystems and can replace a same-named skill without a separate setup action. The inspected skill is package-aligned UI guidance, so this is an agent extension lifecycle risk rather than a confirmed attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs `node ./bin/ai.js` from its postinstall hook.
- The CLI targets skill directories for Cursor, Claude, and Codex; with no target flags, it selects all three.
- The CLI uses the consumer's current directory to find a Git root, then copies the package skill into the selected agent directories.
- Copying removes an existing same-named skill directory first; the Codex target also causes the CLI to update the repository's `AGENTS.md`.
- The installed skill contains admin UI component guidance.
- Searches of `bin/ai.js` found no `fetch(` or `child_process` references.
Source & flagged code
7 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.10.0.
See all versions of @ensi-platform/admin-ui for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.10.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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