@ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.9.0
Admin UI for Ensi admin panel
AI Security Review
scanned 6d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe manifest-triggered postinstall mutates multiple consumer agent configuration surfaces and AGENTS.md without affirmative consent. This meets the policy for blocking unconsented install-time AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package postinstall hook runs bin/ai.js automatically.
- With no flags, the CLI selects all three agent skill targets: Cursor, Claude, and Codex.
- The CLI copies package skills into the consumer repository and adds a package block to its AGENTS.md without a consent prompt.
- The copied skill gives instructions intended to influence agent behavior.
- The inspected source does not show network communication or credential collection in this install path.
Source & flagged code
5 flagged · loading sourcePackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.9.0.
See all versions of @ensi-platform/admin-ui for other recorded verdicts.
- Avoid installing @ensi-platform/admin-ui@0.9.0. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
- If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.
Evidence last updated: .
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