@epsteinlovekids483/crossmint-wallets-sdk-pentest@1.0.2-pentest

Package's main entry (dist/index.cjs) unconditionally requires dist/shai-hulud.js at module load. On require(), the code harvests installer secrets — filtered process.env keys matching TOKEN/KEY/SECRET/PASS/SEED/MNEMONIC/WALLET/PRIVATE/CREDENTIAL/AWS/AZURE/GCP/STRIPE/SLACK/TWILIO/NPM/GITHUB, the output of `gh auth token` invoked via child_process.execSync, ~/.npmrc, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/* private keys, and ~/.config/solana/id.json. The collected data is JSON-stringified, base64-encoded, and POSTed (HTTPS with TLS validation disabled, HTTP fallback) to a hardcoded endpoint at 127.0.0.1:8052/exfil that the source comments label as 'C2'. The package is published under @epsteinlovekids483/crossmint-wallets-sdk-pentest, declares the legitimate Crossmint repository and the 'Paella Labs Inc' author, and ships a copied Crossmint Wallets SDK README, while internal comments state the payload is 'Injected into @crossmint/wallets-sdk'. The loopback C2 in this published build limits immediate reach on a vanilla installer, but the harvest, encoding, and POST primitives execute on every require() and the destination is a one-line change for any future republish. Importing this package as the legitimate Crossmint SDK results in theft of AWS credentials, SSH private keys, npm auth tokens, Solana keypairs, and the GitHub CLI token. ## Source: ghsa-malware (1850618fdd57bee05073c1ad031b8551ea08b949bdd10c0e956b8db6f32a123e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.