---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@essencefromexistence/tui/v/1.0.2"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@essencefromexistence/tui/v/1.0.2.md"
package: "@essencefromexistence/tui"
report_status: "published"
title: "@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "1.0.2"
---

# @essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 13 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Staged payload carrier
- **Selected version:** 1.0.2
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The postinstall flow automatically installs a companion executable whose archive checksum is supplied by the same host as the archive, without an independent integrity anchor. The package's stated binary-installer purpose and the runtime's apparent video-feature role make this a warning rather than a clear attack.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 78.0%
- **Started:** 2026-11-21T23:35:56.302Z
- **Finished:** 2026-11-21T23:36:59.071Z
- **Download time:** 506 ms
- **Static scan time:** 107 ms
- **AI review time:** 62156 ms
- **Total time:** 62769 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Postinstall fetches and extracts a video-player executable using metadata and a checksum served by the same fixed host.

- **Trigger:** npm postinstall, including when the main binary is already installed.

- **Impact:** A compromised or changed metadata response and archive from that host can supply an unreviewed companion executable; the source does not establish malicious behavior.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, install.js, base-url.json

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-11-21T23:36:59.071Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The installer reads runtime/latest.json, selects a platform archive, downloads it, checks it against the checksum from that response, and extracts it into the user's DX video data directory.

- **Rationale:** The postinstall flow automatically installs a companion executable whose archive checksum is supplied by the same host as the archive, without an independent integrity anchor. The package's stated binary-installer purpose and the runtime's apparent video-feature role make this a warning rather than a clear attack.

- **Files touched:** install.js, manifest.json, base-url.json, bin/.installed.json, bin/\<platform-specific dx-tui binary\>, \<user DX data directory\>/Video/dx-video-player\[.exe\], \<user temporary directory\>/dx-video-player.zip

- **Network endpoints:** pub-4ecdb6995d2b41819a9625fa970dde83.r2.dev, pub-8f4b15b69ca54c9881a7292d8b54173c.r2.dev

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 78.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The postinstall hook runs install.js automatically., The installer fetches runtime/latest.json from a fixed R2 host, then uses the response's archive filename and SHA-256 to download and extract the video-player binary., The install flow calls ensureAux after installing or finding dx-tui, so the video-player fetch is part of the default install path., The video-player checksum comes from the same response host as the archive, so it does not provide an independent integrity check.

- **Evidence against:** The package is described as an installer for the dx-tui binary, and its main binary is checked against a SHA-256 value shipped in manifest.json., The additional download is identified in source as the dx-video-player runtime, consistent with a companion for the TUI's video feature.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2.

- Review the evidence and your use of @essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node install.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node install.js
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Unverified Remote Native Payload Install
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/package.json>)

Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node install.js
Install-time code downloads an unverified remote native archive, stages it locally, activates an executable path, and exposes it to process execution.
L6: const os = require("os")
L7: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
L8: 
...
L84: process.stdout.write("Downloading " + url + " ... ")
L85: const res = await fetch(url)
L86: if (!res.ok) throw new Error("HTTP " + res.status + " for " + url)
L87: const tmp = path.join(binDir, name + ".tmp")
L88: const out = fs.createWriteStream(tmp)
L89: const hash = crypto.createHash("sha256")
...
L93: if (got !== sha) {
L94: fs.unlinkSync(tmp)
L95: throw new Error("SHA-256 mismatch for " + name + ": expected " + sha + " got " + got)
```

### 8. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/install.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const os = require("os")
L7: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
L8: 
L9: const manifest = require("./manifest.json")
L10: const base = (process.env.DX_BINARY_BASE_URL || require("./base-url.json").url).replace(/\/$/, "")
L11: const binDir = path.join(__dirname, "bin")
L12: const BARE = ["dx-tui.exe", "dx-tui"]
...
L40: function candidates() {
L41: const os = process.platform
L42: const arch = process.arch
...
L83: const url = base + "/" + encodeURIComponent(name)
L84: process.stdout.write("Downloading " + url + " ... ")
```

### 9. High: Install Named Payload File
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/install.js>)

Install-named source file stages remote content through filesystem writes and execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L6: const os = require("os")
L7: const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
L8: 
L9: const manifest = require("./manifest.json")
L10: const base = (process.env.DX_BINARY_BASE_URL || require("./base-url.json").url).replace(/\/$/, "")
L11: const binDir = path.join(__dirname, "bin")
L12: const BARE = ["dx-tui.exe", "dx-tui"]
...
L40: function candidates() {
L41: const os = process.platform
L42: const arch = process.arch
...
L83: const url = base + "/" + encodeURIComponent(name)
L84: process.stdout.write("Downloading " + url + " ... ")
```

### 10. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 11. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 12. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 13. High: Semantic Analysis Limited
- **Category:** Scanner Coverage
- **Confidence:** 100.0%
- **Path:** install.js\#virtual:string-array:round1
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@essencefromexistence/tui@1.0.2/install.js%23virtual%3Astring-array%3Around1>)

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```text
stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 1
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @essencefromexistence/tui
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 1.0.2
- **License:** MIT OR Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-11-21T19:46:54.708Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-11-18T22:03:19.915Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T03:04:23.099Z
- **Known versions:** 11
- **Latest version:** 1.0.3
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** Installs the dx-tui binary for the DX toolchain
- **Deprecated:** withdrawn: GPL dependency issue - do not use; a replacement will be published
- **Maintainers:** essencefromexistence
- **Supported OS:** linux, darwin, win32
- **Supported CPU:** x64, arm64
- **Artifact files:** 8
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 20,867 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@essencefromexistence/tui/v/1.0.2>)
- [Homepage](<https://dx.essencefromexistence.com/>)
