---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@everme/cli/v/0.33.1"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@everme/cli/v/0.33.1.md"
package: "@everme/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@everme/cli@0.33.1 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.33.1"
---

# @everme/cli@0.33.1 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged as agent extension risk** — Allowed by default with warning: install-time first-party agent extension setup was detected.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Warn-only agent extension risk
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Agent extension lifecycle risk
- **Selected version:** 0.33.1
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

This is a guarded, package-aligned agent extension refresh rather than confirmed malicious behavior. Its install-time updates to existing agent integrations warrant a warning.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 86.0%
- **Started:** 2026-08-28T06:54:54.651Z
- **Finished:** 2026-08-28T06:55:40.306Z
- **Download time:** 516 ms
- **Static scan time:** 173 ms
- **AI review time:** 44965 ms
- **Total time:** 45655 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** During postinstall, the package downloads a verified native binary and refreshes previously configured EverMe agent plugins. This can update an existing Codex-related extension and its package specification without a separate user command.

- **Trigger:** npm installation outside CI, root, or sudo contexts when the binary reports an existing EverMe host entry.

- **Impact:** Existing EverMe integrations can be moved to latest and their plugin state updated.

- **Evidence paths:** package.json, scripts/install.js, scripts/upgrade-plugins.js, sha256sums.txt

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-08-28T06:55:40.306Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Verified binary download followed by guarded agent-plugin refresh.

- **Rationale:** This is a guarded, package-aligned agent extension refresh rather than confirmed malicious behavior. Its install-time updates to existing agent integrations warrant a warning.

- **Files touched:** bin/evercli, sha256sums.txt, scripts/upgrade-plugins.js

- **Network endpoints:** github.com, registry.npmmirror.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 86.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Low

- **Evidence for warning:** The postinstall hook downloads and executes a native binary., Postinstall refreshes only hosts already marked with an EverMe entry, including Codex., It rewrites matching EverMe MCP package specs to use @latest and invokes plugin-update commands.

- **Evidence against:** Downloaded archives are checked against package-shipped SHA-256 values before extraction., The config rewrite targets only the EverMe package spec and skips CI, root, and sudo installs., No source evidence shows credential exfiltration, destructive actions, or arbitrary shell interpolation.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @everme/cli@0.33.1.

- Review the evidence and your use of @everme/cli@0.33.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@everme/cli@0.33.1/package.json>)

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
```

### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 75.0%
- **Path:** package.json
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@everme/cli@0.33.1/package.json>)

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```json
scripts.postinstall = node scripts/install.js
```

### 3. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 7. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 8. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 9. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** scripts/install.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@everme/cli@0.33.1/scripts/install.js>)

The postinstall hook downloads and executes a native binary.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
function install() {
  const mirrorUrls = getMirrorUrls(process.env);
  const downloadUrls = [GITHUB_URL, ...mirrorUrls];

  fs.mkdirSync(binDir, { recursive: true });

  const tmpDir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "everme-cli-"));
  const archivePath = path.join(tmpDir, archiveName);

  try {
    // Walk the chain in order; stop at the first success.
    let lastErr;
    let downloaded = false;
    for (const url of downloadUrls) {
      try {
        download(url, archivePath);
        downloaded = true;
        break;
      } catch (e) {
        lastErr = e;
      }
    }
    if (!
```

### 10. Medium: Suspicious Lifecycle Evidence
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** scripts/upgrade-plugins.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@everme/cli@0.33.1/scripts/upgrade-plugins.js>)

Postinstall refreshes only hosts already marked with an EverMe entry, including Codex.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
// The npx patch and the plugin refresh are not alternatives: codex needs
  // both (npx spec in config.toml + marketplace-shipped hook bundle), so
  // the two dispatches run in sequence rather than as one if/else chain.
  for (const h of hosts) {
    if (!h || h.hasEverMeEntry !== true) continue;
    try {
      if (NPX_PLATFORMS.has(h.platform) && h.configPath && patchNpxSpec(h.configPath)) {
        log(`[@everme/cli] ${h.platform}: pinned memory-mcp to @latest`);
      }
      if (h.platform === "claude-code") {
        refreshClaudeCode(binPath, runner);
      } else if (h.platform ===
```

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall
- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @everme/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.33.1
- **License:** Apache-2.0
- **Version published:** 2026-08-28T06:44:33.474Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-09T16:00:52.975Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-20T08:28:08.432Z
- **Known versions:** 29
- **Latest version:** 0.33.19
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** EverMe CLI — npm wrapper that downloads and runs the platform-native evercli binary on first use.
- **Maintainers:** junquan.yao, alwaysday1
- **Keywords:** evermind, everme, cli, memory, ai, agent
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=18.0.0
- **Supported OS:** darwin, linux, win32
- **Supported CPU:** x64, arm64
- **Artifact files:** 8
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 45,535 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 1
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@everme/cli/v/0.33.1>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverMe>)
- [Homepage](<https://everme.evermind.ai/>)
- [Issues](<https://github.com/EverMind-AI/EverMe/issues>)
