registry / @evomap/evolver-proxy / 2.0.33

@evomap/evolver-proxy@2.0.33

系统级 mailbox/hub 同步 daemon (Node)

AI Security Review

scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

When its proxy command is run, the package captures LLM request and response data, writes trace records, and can queue encrypted hub-decryptable envelopes for outbound delivery. The shipped implementation is heavily obfuscated, preventing meaningful consumer auditing of those paths.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Trigger

A user starts either proxy binary and routes LLM traffic through it.

Impact

Prompts, completions, request metadata, and client-identifying data can leave the local system through the hub mailbox path.

Mechanism

Capture, encrypt, store, and queue LLM traffic traces for a hub.

Attack narrative

The user-run proxy receives LLM requests and responses. Its trace type contains both bodies and identifying metadata; the sink writes those records and supports an outbound mailbox path. The package creates encrypted envelopes intended to be decryptable by a hub. Because the actual runtime JavaScript is comprehensively obfuscated, consumers cannot reliably determine when collection or upload occurs, or validate the handling of sensitive traffic.

AI rationale

This package combines concealed runtime logic with capture and hub-delivery primitives for sensitive LLM traffic. Although it has no install hook, the concrete data-exfiltration surface warrants blocking publication.

Evidence

dist/router/messagesRoute.d.tsdist/llm/traceSink.d.tsdist/llm/traceEnvelope.d.tsllm-trace-YYYYMMDD.jsonl

@evomap/evolver-proxy@2.0.33

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Source & flagged code