@exla/rudder@3.9.1

⚠ Under review

A TUI for managing coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex and opencode side by side, each in its own isolated jj workspace.

AI Security Review

scanned 23h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The inspected package behavior does not establish a concrete attack: its install hook sets up Jujutsu, and the reviewed credential and agent-related paths align with the product’s cloud and local tooling functions. However, the selected @xterm/headless runtime dependency is loaded by the package and its bundled source remains materially unresolved, so this review cannot certify the package as clean.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Use of the terminal echo predictor loads the declared terminal dependency.

Impact

The dependency’s remaining behavior cannot be determined from the inspected source, so a clean conclusion is not supported.

Mechanism

The package imports the dependency as its headless terminal model; its bundled implementation was too large to resolve fully in the available inspection.

AI rationale

Evidence

package.jsondist/predict.js.lpm-dependency-evidence-3487e0c3-e4a9-442f-acab-3861f4a9ebd1/0/npm-linux/lib-headless/xterm-headless.js.lpm-dependency-evidence-3487e0c3-e4a9-442f-acab-3861f4a9ebd1/0/npm-linux/package.json

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Manual Review at 76.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.

AI review observations

The package declares a runtime dependency on @xterm/headless, and dist/predict.js loads it when the terminal echo predictor is used.
The dependency’s selected entry is a large bundled file; relevant behavior remains unresolved after the bounded source inspection.
Cloud credential staging is part of explicit cloud functionality, and keychain access is attempted only when a human is at a terminal.
The reviewed agent-related locations read local skills, conversation metadata, and model cache data.

Evidence against

The postinstall hook imports the Jujutsu setup helper and skips setup when requested or running as root.
Codex usage credentials are sent to the ChatGPT usage endpoint, consistent with the quota lookup.

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

24 flagged

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

1scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs Install-time code downloads an unverified remote native archive, stages it locally, activates an executable path, and exposes it to process execution. L1: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L10: // ~/.rudder/bin/jj/<version>/ and puts that directory on PATH for itself and L11: // everything it starts: the native dashboard, workers and agents all inherit L12: // it. A jj the user installed (brew, cargo, a distro package) always wins. ... L15: // (`git worktree add --orphan`), and stock macOS and Debian 12 ship git 2.39, L16: // so every isolated agent would fail to start on exactly the machines that have L17: // nothing installed. 0.40.0 is also what the cloud worker

High

Unverified Remote Native Payload Install

Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L1

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg

dist/onboarding.jsView file

5// both rotate refresh tokens, and a shared copy signs one side out. L6: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L7: import readline from "node:readline/promises";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/onboarding.jsView on unpkg · L5

dist/util.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/util.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg

1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L7: import readline from "node:readline/promises"; L8: import { stdin as input, stdout as output } from "node:process"; L9: const DEFAULT_PATH = [ ... L24: export function rudderHome() { L25: return path.resolve(process.env.RUDDER_HOME?.trim() || path.join(os.homedir(), ".rudder")); L26: } ... L65: const raw = await fsp.readFile(filePath, "utf8"); L66: return JSON.parse(raw); L67: } ... L160: const TOOL_INSTALL_HINTS = {

Low

Weak Crypto

Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.

dist/util.jsView on unpkg · L1

dist/improve/schedule.jsView file

7Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js -> dist/main.js -> dist/improve/index.js -> dist/improve/schedule.js L7: function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

High

Trigger Reachable Persistence

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

7function plistPath() { L8: return path.join(os.homedir(), "Library", "LaunchAgents", `${LAUNCHD_LABEL}.plist`); L9: } ... L49: export async function scheduleCommand(action) { L50: if (process.platform !== "darwin") { L51: throw new Error("rudder improve schedule currently supports macOS (launchd) only; run `rudder improve run` from cron/systemd on other platforms."); ... L59: // Re-bootstrap idempotently: boot out any prior registration first. L60: await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootout", `gui/${uid}/${LAUNCHD_LABEL}`], { allowFailure: true }); L61: const bootstrap = await runCommand("launchctl", ["bootstrap", `gui/${uid}`, plistPath()], {

Medium

Install Persistence

Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration.

dist/improve/schedule.jsView on unpkg · L7

assets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjsView file

108async function refresh(cred) { L109: const response = await fetch("https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token", { L110: method: "POST", ... L121: if (cachedToken) return cachedToken; L122: if (process.env.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN) return (cachedToken = process.env.GOOGLE_OAUTH_ACCESS_TOKEN); L123: try { L124: const t = execFileSync("gcloud", ["auth", "print-access-token"], { encoding: "utf8", stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim(); L125: if (t) return (cachedToken = t);

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

assets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjsView on unpkg · L108

13// node gcp.mjs audit --project tempo-exla L14: // node gcp.mjs oauth-plan --project tempo-exla --name "Tempo" --home https://tempo.example.com \ L15: // --support you@example.com --redirect https://tempo.example.com/api/auth/callback/google [--redirect …] \ ... L21: L22: import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process"; L23: import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; ... L90: function gcloudConfigDir() { L91: return process.env.CLOUDSDK_CONFIG || join(homedir(), ".config", "gcloud"); L92: } ... L111: headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, L112: body: new URLSearchParams({ client_id: cred.client_id, client_secret: cred.client_secret, refresh_token: cred.refresh_token, grant_type: "refresh_token" }), L113: });

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

assets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjsView on unpkg · L13

dist/cloud.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cloud.js: "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/settings.json", "~/.claude/hooks", "~/.claude/CLAUDE.md", "~/.claude.json", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.codex/config.toml", "~/.codex/AGENTS.md",

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/cloud.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView file

•path = dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-native kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 5387448 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView on unpkg

dist/improve/collect.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 7

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/improve/collect.jsView on unpkg

dist/usage.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/usage.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/usage.jsView on unpkg

dist/backends.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/backends.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/backends.jsView on unpkg

dist/board/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/board/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/board/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/handoff.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/handoff.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/handoff.jsView on unpkg

dist/run-manager.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/run-manager.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/run-manager.jsView on unpkg

dist/task-summary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/task-summary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/task-summary.jsView on unpkg

dist/version-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-check.jsView on unpkg

dist/feedback.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/feedback.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/feedback.jsView on unpkg

dist/improve/state.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/improve/state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/improve/state.jsView on unpkg

dist/jj-binary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @exla/rudder@3.8.3 matchedPath = dist/jj-binary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4bGEvcnVkZGVy:3.8.3 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/jj-binary.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

24 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

High

Unverified Remote Native Payload Install

Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L1

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Findings

20 High6 Medium5 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/onboarding.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionassets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjs

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cloud.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationassets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjs

HighUnverified Remote Native Payload Installpackage.json

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/improve/schedule.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/improve/collect.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cloud.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/usage.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/util.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @exla/rudder@3.9.1.

See all versions of @exla/rudder for other recorded verdicts.

Review the evidence and your use of @exla/rudder@3.9.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-22 03:55:17.651Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.