registry / Credential exfiltration / @exla/rudder / 3.9.6

@exla/rudder@3.9.6

A TUI for managing coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex and opencode side by side, each in its own isolated jj workspace.

AI Security Review

scanned 8h ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

The cloud workflow transfers saved third-party credentials to a package-selected service without recipient-specific consent. This is concrete credential exfiltration and warrants blocking.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; source matched previously finalized malicious package; routed for review

Trigger

Running `rudder cloud` or `rudder cloud --snapshot` in a repository without a GitHub origin enters snapshot attachment.

Impact

A remote cloud workspace receives saved third-party login credentials and can use those accounts as the user.

Mechanism

Snapshot defaults include Claude’s credentials file and Codex’s auth file. When the cloud vault is inactive, those files—and on macOS Claude’s Keychain token—are included in an archive sent to the cloud endpoint.

Attack narrative

When the user runs the cloud command for a repository without a GitHub origin, the package builds a snapshot containing default home paths, including Claude’s saved OAuth credentials and Codex’s authentication file. If no cloud vault is active, those credentials are included; on macOS, Claude’s Keychain token is also staged. The archive is sent to the package’s fixed cloud endpoint without asking whether these third-party credentials may be shared.

AI rationale

The cloud workflow transfers saved third-party credentials to a package-selected service without recipient-specific consent. This is concrete credential exfiltration and warrants blocking.

Evidence

dist/main.jsdist/cloud.js~/.claude/.credentials.json~/.codex/auth.json

Network endpoints2

rudder-cloud-control.fly.dev/api/rudder/workspace/attach

Decision evidence

public snapshot

AI called this Malicious at 98.0% confidence as Malware with low false-positive risk.

Evidence for block

The CLI routes `rudder cloud`; its default and snapshot forms reach snapshot attachment when the repository lacks a GitHub origin.
The snapshot’s default home-path list includes Claude’s saved credentials and Codex’s authentication file, and normalization retains those defaults.
Snapshot creation includes home credentials by default; on macOS it also stages Claude’s Keychain OAuth token as a credentials file.
Without an active cloud vault, the workspace snapshot sets credential inclusion to true; vault lookup failure falls back to legacy snapshot behavior.
The archive is included as base64 in a request to the package’s default cloud service at `/api/rudder/workspace/attach`.

Evidence against

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsMinifiedUrlStrings

Source & flagged code

24 flagged

package.jsonView file

Lines 1-58json

2 "name": "@exla/rudder",

3 "version": "3.9.6",

4 "description": "A TUI for managing coding agents: run Claude Code, Codex and opencode side by side, each in its own isolated jj workspace.",

5 "keywords": [

6 "tui",

7 "coding-agents",

8 "claude-code",

9 "codex",

10 "opencode",

11 "ai-agents",

12 "jujutsu",

13 "terminal",

14 "cli"

15 ],

16 "license": "Elastic-2.0",

17 "homepage": "https://rudder.exla.ai",

18 "repository": {

19 "type": "git",

20 "url": "git+https://github.com/exla-ai/rudder.git"

21 },

22 "type": "module",

23 "bin": {

High

Unverified Remote Native Payload Install

Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L1

24 "rudder": "dist/index.js"

25 },

26 "scripts": {

27 "clean": "node -e \"require('fs').rmSync('dist',{recursive:true,force:true})\"",

28 "build": "npm run clean && tsc -p tsconfig.json && npm run build-board && npm run build-native && npm run copy-native && npm run chmod-cli",

29 "build-board": "esbuild src/board/ui/index.tsx --bundle --minify --format=esm --jsx=automatic --jsx-import-source=preact --outfile=dist/board/board.js && esbuild src/board/ui/board.css --bundle --minify --outfile=dist/board/board.css",

30 "build-native": "cargo build --release --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml",

31 "check": "tsc -p tsconfig.json --noEmit",

32 "test": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && npm run chmod-cli && node --test tests/*.test.mjs",

33 "test:tui": "node --test tests/tui/*.test.mjs",

34 "test:worker-scroll": "cargo test --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml top_origin_scroll_region_history_scrolls_like_terminal_scrollback && cargo test --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml worker_wheel && cargo test --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml wheel_scroll && cargo test --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml worker_page && cargo test --manifest-path native/Cargo.toml codex_alternate_screen_page_key",

35 "copy-native": "node scripts/copy-native.mjs",

36 "chmod-cli": "node -e \"require('fs').chmodSync('dist/index.js',0o755)\"",

37 "prepack": "npm run build",

38 "postinstall": "node scripts/postinstall.mjs",

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L38

Medium

Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script

Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L38

39 "start": "node dist/index.js",

40 "test:tui:report": "rm -rf .tui-report tui-report.html && node --test --test-reporter=spec --test-reporter-destination=stdout --test-reporter=tui-integration-tests/reporter --test-reporter-destination=tui-report.html tests/tui/*.test.mjs",

41 "mutate:tui": "node tests/tui/mutate.mjs"

42 },

43 "files": [

44 "dist/",

45 "assets/",

46 "scripts/copy-native.mjs",

47 "scripts/postinstall.mjs",

48 "README.md",

49 "package.json"

50 ],

51 "publishConfig": {

52 "access": "public"

53 },

54 "engines": {

55 "node": ">=22"

56 },

57 "devDependencies": {

58 "@types/node": "^22.15.3",

dist/onboarding.jsView file

Lines 1-25javascript

1// A new computer, right after `rudder login` (and from `rudder doctor`): can it

2// run agents, and what is already waiting in the cloud? Claude Code and Codex

3// are offered for install and their own sign-in, at a y/N prompt, only on an

4// interactive terminal. Their logins are never copied from the cloud vault:

5// both rotate refresh tokens, and a shared copy signs one side out.

6import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

7import readline from "node:readline/promises"

dist/util.jsView file

Lines 1-21javascript

1import { spawn, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";

2import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

3import fs from "node:fs";

4import fsp from "node:fs/promises";

dist/improve/schedule.jsView file

Lines 1-27javascript

1import os from "node:os";

2import path from "node:path";

3import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";

4import { ensureDir, pathExists, runCommand, shortenHome } from

assets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjsView file

Lines 1-33javascript

1#!/usr/bin/env node

2// Google Cloud helper for agents. No dependencies; Node 18+.

3//

4// Does everything Google exposes an API for (identity, projects, APIs) and,

5// for the parts that only exist in the Cloud Console (OAuth branding and

6// clients), prints the exact pages and values, then verifies the result from

7// the outside the way a user would see it.

8//

9// node gcp.mjs whoami

10// node gcp.mjs projects [--filter text]

dist/cloud.jsView file

•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/cloud.js: "~/.claude/.credentials.json", "~/.claude/settings.json", "~/.claude/hooks", "~/.claude/CLAUDE.md", "~/.claude.json", "~/.codex/auth.json", "~/.codex/config.toml", "~/.codex/AGENTS.md",

High

Credential Redirect Persistence

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/cloud.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/cloud.jsView on unpkg

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView file

•path = dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-native kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 5395096 magicHex = [redacted]

Medium

Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

dist/native/darwin-x64/rudder-nativeView on unpkg

dist/improve/collect.jsView file

•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 7

High

Semantic Analysis Limited

A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.

dist/improve/collect.jsView on unpkg

dist/usage.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/usage.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/usage.jsView on unpkg

dist/backends.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/backends.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/backends.jsView on unpkg

dist/board/daemon.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/board/daemon.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/board/daemon.jsView on unpkg

dist/handoff.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/handoff.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/handoff.jsView on unpkg

dist/run-manager.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/run-manager.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/run-manager.jsView on unpkg

dist/task-summary.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/task-summary.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/task-summary.jsView on unpkg

dist/version-check.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/version-check.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/version-check.jsView on unpkg

dist/feedback.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/feedback.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/feedback.jsView on unpkg

dist/improve/state.jsView file

•matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @viraatdas/rudder@3.9.6 matchedPath = dist/improve/state.js matchedIdentity = npm:QHZpcmFhdGRhcy9ydWRkZXI:3.9.6 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source

High

Known Malware Source Similarity

Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review.

dist/improve/state.jsView on unpkg

Source & flagged code

24 flagged · loading source

package.jsonView file

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

High

Install Time Lifecycle Scripts

Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.

package.jsonView on unpkg

1scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs Install-time code downloads an unverified remote native archive, stages it locally, activates an executable path, and exposes it to process execution. L1: import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; L2: import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; ... L10: // ~/.rudder/bin/jj/<version>/ and puts that directory on PATH for itself and L11: // everything it starts: the native dashboard, workers and agents all inherit L12: // it. A jj the user installed (brew, cargo, a distro package) always wins. ... L15: // (`git worktree add --orphan`), and stock macOS and Debian 12 ship git 2.39, L16: // so every isolated agent would fail to start on exactly the machines that have L17: // nothing installed. 0.40.0 is also what the cloud worker

High

Unverified Remote Native Payload Install

Install-time source downloads a native archive from a fixed external host without transport verification, extracts it, and installs an executable payload.

package.jsonView on unpkg · L1

•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.mjs

Findings

20 High6 Medium5 Low

HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json

HighChild Processdist/onboarding.js

HighSame File Env Network Executionassets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjs

HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cloud.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationassets/skills/google-cloud/scripts/gcp.mjs

HighUnverified Remote Native Payload Installpackage.json

HighTrigger Reachable Persistencedist/improve/schedule.js

HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/improve/collect.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/cloud.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/usage.js

HighKnown Malware Source Similaritydist/util.js

Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @exla/rudder@3.9.6.

See all versions of @exla/rudder for other recorded verdicts.

Avoid installing @exla/rudder@3.9.6. Remove it from direct dependencies and check your lockfile for transitive copies.
Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
If this version ran, investigate the affected machine and build environment. Rotate credentials it could access and rebuild from a trusted environment.

Evidence last updated: 2026-10-22 21:13:11.475Z (UTC).

Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.

AI Security Review

Decision evidence

Source & flagged code

Source & flagged code

Findings

Affected versions and remediation

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Behavioral surface

Related packages

Other credential exfiltration packages

Source & flagged code