@extenshi/cli@0.14.2
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms an install-time telemetry ping, but it is gated on existing explicit consent and sends only coarse metadata. Other sensitive operations are tied to named user commands, with no concrete malicious behavior found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- postinstall reads ~/.extenshi/config.json and can send an install telemetry event.
- The lifecycle script can create an anonymous ID in the same config file after consent.
- postinstall exits unless recorded telemetry is exactly true.
- Install telemetry is limited to package/version, runtime, OS/arch, and anonymous ID.
- CLI telemetry prompts on an interactive first run before emitting events.
- Networked scanning and publishing are explicit CLI commands; scan upload is user-invoked.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/review-checks.jsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.14.2.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.14.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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