@extenshi/cli@0.15.1
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a postinstall hook, but its telemetry path is guarded by recorded user consent and sends limited installation metadata. The inspected CLI behavior is consistent with its scanner and update-check functionality, with no concrete attack surface established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes the CLI and runs scripts/postinstall.cjs after installation.
- The postinstall exits unless telemetry consent is recorded as true; it also skips workspace installs and CI.
- The postinstall sends an installation event with package version and coarse runtime metadata; no credentials or package contents are included in the payload.
- The CLI provides a browser extension scanning command, and its update check reads the npm registry.
- The postinstall can send telemetry during installation after consent, and its destination can be overridden with EXTENSHI_POSTHOG_HOST.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/auto-update.jsView on unpkg · L25Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.15.1.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.15.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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