@extenshi/cli@0.15.2
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection confirms a postinstall telemetry ping, but it is skipped without previously saved positive consent and contains no credential or project-file harvesting. Other network, file, and process operations are aligned with explicit scanner, publishing, reporting, and login commands.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- postinstall exists and can send an install event.
- Postinstall reads and may update ~/.extenshi/config.json.
- Postinstall exits unless telemetry was previously recorded true.
- Install payload is limited to anonymous telemetry and coarse platform/version fields.
- Artifact upload occurs only through the explicit scan command.
- Browser launch and loopback listener are explicit login flow behavior.
- No hidden shell execution, remote code loading, credential exfiltration, or AI-agent config writes found.
Source & flagged code
5 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.
dist/review-checks.jsFindings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.15.2.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.15.2 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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