@extenshi/cli@0.23.1
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 25d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package has a postinstall telemetry hook, but it requires previously recorded positive consent and sends limited install metadata. The flagged runtime process and package-install references are used for browser login, generated instructions, or explicit screenshot setup; no concrete attack behavior was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json runs a postinstall hook that leads to the inspected telemetry script.
- The postinstall exits unless the user has already recorded telemetry consent; it sends install metadata to the configured PostHog host.
- The CLI asks for telemetry consent before recording command events.
- Browser launching uses platform browser commands with the login URL as an argument.
- The AMO source command generates build instructions; the npm install string is output text, not executed here.
- Screenshot support resolves Playwright and describes a user-run install command; no install is performed at import.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/login-runtime.jsView on unpkg · L11Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.23.1.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.23.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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