registry / @extenshi/cli / 0.25.0
@extenshi/cli@0.25.0
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found an install-time telemetry hook, but it requires explicit prior telemetry consent and skips CI. The other flagged behaviors are command-bound browser login, screenshot capture, and clean-room build verification; no concrete attack surface was established.
Static reason
One or more suspicious static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
Package installation runs the postinstall hook; telemetry transmission additionally requires saved consent and is skipped in CI.
Impact
The observed effect is consent-gated telemetry; no credential collection or attack behavior was established.
Mechanism
After the consent gate, the hook sends an install event containing an anonymous identifier and basic runtime details to the configured PostHog host.
AI rationale
Source inspection found an install-time telemetry hook, but it requires explicit prior telemetry consent and skips CI. The other flagged behaviors are command-bound browser login, screenshot capture, and clean-room build verification; no concrete attack surface was established.
Evidence
package.jsonscripts/postinstall.cjsdist/login-runtime.jsdist/amo-source.jsdist/cli.jsdist/screenshots.js
Network endpoints1
eu.i.posthog.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Clean at 91.0% confidence as Benign with low false-positive risk.
Evidence for AI clean decision
- The manifest runs a postinstall script; the script sends anonymous install telemetry only when saved config records telemetry consent.
- The browser login runtime uses a loopback callback listener.
- The AMO source command executes supplied build commands in a clean room when invoked.
- The CLI parses user commands, and screenshot capture launches a persistent Chromium context.
Evidence against
- The postinstall script skips CI and exits unless telemetry consent is explicitly recorded.
- The inspected runtime behaviors are tied to CLI commands; no attack behavior was identified in the required files.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoDynamicRequireEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsTelemetryUrlStrings
NoLicense
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgdist/login-runtime.jsView file
11*/
L12: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process';
L13: import http from 'node:http';
High
Child Process
Package source references child process execution.
dist/login-runtime.jsView on unpkg · L11Findings
1 Critical5 High5 Medium8 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/screenshots.js
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processdist/login-runtime.js
HighShell
HighRuntime Package Installdist/amo-source.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/cli.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumDynamic Requiredist/screenshots.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Crypto
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.25.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.25.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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