@extenshi/cli@0.27.0
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiPay operations forward an existing Extenshi API key to an environment-configurable BFF with no destination allowlist. The default is the Extenshi BFF and the affected calls require explicit Pay commands, so the evidence supports conditional credential exposure rather than a covert attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The Pay helper sends the configured Extenshi API key as bearer authorization to the URL built from the configured BFF address.
- The BFF defaults to Extenshi, but the `EXTENSHI_BFF_URL` environment variable can redirect requests; the inspected code applies no host allowlist.
- The credential-forwarding helper is reached by explicit Pay commands and the explicit Pay test-cycle command registered by the CLI.
- The postinstall hook sends separate adoption telemetry only after recorded positive telemetry consent; its payload contains an anonymous identifier and coarse environment details.
Source & flagged code
8 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/login-runtime.jsView on unpkg · L11Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.27.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.27.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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