@extenshi/cli@0.36.0
Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions
AI Security Review
scanned 7d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a postinstall telemetry hook, but it exits unless the shared config already records telemetry consent. Runtime credential transfers are associated with explicit CLI operations and Extenshi service endpoints; the flagged static indicators did not establish a separate attack.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The postinstall hook is declared in the manifest, but its telemetry send is gated on previously recorded telemetry consent; absent consent exits the hook.
- Runtime API keys are sent with explicit CLI operations to Extenshi BFF endpoints, and Pay sends use its configured BFF URL.
- The reviewed modules and prepared dependencies support extension scanning, publishing, reports, screenshots, and local asset work; no separate attack behavior was identified.
Source & flagged code
10 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references child process execution.
dist/login-runtime.jsView on unpkg · L11Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.36.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/cli for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.36.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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