--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@extenshi/cli/v/0.40.0" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@extenshi/cli/v/0.40.0.md" package: "@extenshi/cli" report_status: "published" title: "@extenshi/cli@0.40.0 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "0.40.0" --- # @extenshi/cli@0.40.0 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 21 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Telemetry warning (can be blocked) - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** Telemetry - **Selected version:** 0.40.0 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions. AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. The package asks before enabling runtime telemetry, but its error-reporting path appears capable of sending local paths outside the redaction rules despite promising users that paths are excluded. This is an undisclosed telemetry overcollection risk, not evidence of credential theft or a malicious install hook. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 81.0% - **Started:** 2026-11-03T19:39:11.427Z - **Finished:** 2026-11-03T19:40:51.067Z - **Download time:** 772 ms - **Static scan time:** 3165 ms - **AI review time:** 95702 ms - **Total time:** 99640 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** Opt-in runtime error telemetry may include local file paths beyond the home-directory paths its sanitizer removes, despite the consent prompt saying paths are never sent. - **Trigger:** A user accepts telemetry, then a command reports an error whose message or stack contains a path not covered by redaction. - **Impact:** Local path details could reach the analytics service beyond what the consent prompt describes. - **Evidence paths:** dist/telemetry-consent.js, dist/telemetry.js, dist/command-lifecycle.js - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-11-03T19:40:51.067Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI submits sanitized exception messages and stacks to PostHog; the sanitizer strips home-directory paths but does not show broader path removal. - **Rationale:** The package asks before enabling runtime telemetry, but its error-reporting path appears capable of sending local paths outside the redaction rules despite promising users that paths are excluded. This is an undisclosed telemetry overcollection risk, not evidence of credential theft or a malicious install hook. - **Files touched:** ~/.extenshi/config.json - **Network endpoints:** https://eu.i.posthog.com ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Confidence:** 81.0% - **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn - **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability - **False-positive risk:** Medium - **Evidence for warning:** Telemetry consent text promises that file paths are never sent., Error telemetry sends sanitized exception messages and stacks; redaction visibly strips home-directory paths but does not establish that other paths are removed., The package runs postinstall telemetry only when the config records telemetry:true. - **Evidence against:** The CLI asks for telemetry consent and provides an off command., The postinstall script exits unless prior positive consent is recorded., The package is a CLI security scanner, and its project/API requests are consistent with that purpose. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @extenshi/cli@0.40.0. - Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/cli@0.40.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. High: Install Time Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 2. Medium: Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** package.json - **Public source:** [View source]() Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```json scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs ``` ### 3. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs. ### 4. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 5. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/login-runtime.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L11: */ L12: import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; L13: import http from 'node:http'; ``` ### 6. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/analytics-init.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1324: spawnInstall: (cmd, args, cwd) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => { L1325: // On Windows the package-manager shims need a shell, and cmd.exe drops an L1326: // unquoted `^` (its escape character): quote the fixed args there, or ``` ### 7. Low: Eval - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 45.0% - **Path:** dist/controls.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L141: */ L142: export const controlTargetFunction = new Function('el', 'how', `if (!el) return null L143: const labelOf = ${LABEL_SCRIPT} ``` ### 8. Medium: Dynamic Require - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/screenshots.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references dynamic require/import behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L48: for (const base of bases) { L49: const req = createRequire(base); L50: for (const name of ['playwright', 'playwright-core', '@playwright/test']) { ``` ### 9. Low: Weak Crypto - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 64.0% - **Path:** dist/evidence-ingest.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L5: * Why the CLI carries it: that action lives in the platform monorepo, which is L6: * private, and the public mirror does not publish it — `uses:` of it 404s in a L7: * developer's repository. The CLI is public on npm, so the scaffold's evidence ... L67: const idempotencyKey = uuidv5(idempotencyName); L68: const serverUrl = input.serverUrl ?? 'https://github.com'; L69: const body = JSON.stringify({ ... L122: try { L123: report = JSON.parse(raw); L124: } ... L153: } L154: export async function runEvidenceIngest(artifact, options, env = process.env) { L155: if (!/^[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}$/i.test(options.project)) ``` ### 10. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 11. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 12. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 13. High: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/analytics-init.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text L670: * file there is a conflict rather than a file to overwrite. An unmarked file L671: * named by --config is the project"s own config instead.\n *\n * The wiring is a real startCollector call outside the SDK, tests and the\n * generated config; with several, the fir... L672: * literal in it, and a `host:` string init accepts. Each is null when the ... L676: const tokens = [...new Set(text.match(/\bphc_[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\b/g) ?? [])]; L677: const hosts = [...text.matchAll(/\bhost\s*:\s*(["\"`])([^""`\n]+)1/g)]\n .map((m) => normalizeHost(m[2]))\n .filter((h) => h !== undefined);\n const distinctHosts ... L678: .option("--json", "Print one JSON object on stdout (announcements go to stderr)") ``` ### 14. High: Runtime Package Install - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 86.0% - **Path:** dist/amo-source.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source invokes a package manager install command at runtime. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L56: { file: 'package-lock.json', manager: 'npm', installCmd: 'npm ci' }, L57: { file: 'yarn.lock', manager: 'yarn', installCmd: 'yarn install --immutable' }, L58: { file: 'pnpm-lock.yaml', manager: 'pnpm', installCmd: 'pnpm install --frozen-lockfile' }, ... L62: function isGitClean(cwd) { L63: const git = (...args) => execFileSync('git', args, { cwd, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'ignore'] }) L64: .toString() ``` ### 15. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 16. Low: Telemetry - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references telemetry or analytics APIs. ### 17. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 18. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 19. Low: No License - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 80.0% Package manifest does not declare a clear license. ### 20. High: Semantic Analysis Limited - **Category:** Scanner Coverage - **Confidence:** 100.0% - **Path:** dist/analytics-init.js\#virtual:normalized:round1 - **Public source:** [View source]() A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```text stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_parse_error; limitedFiles = 16 ``` ### 21. Critical: Previous Version Dangerous Delta - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 93.0% - **Path:** dist/project.js - **Public source:** [View source]() This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = previous_version_dangerous_delta matchedPackage = @extenshi/cli@0.38.1 matchedIdentity = npm:QGV4dGVuc2hpL2NsaQ:0.38.1 similarity = 0.939 summary = stored previous version shares package body but lacks this dangerous source file ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes - **Published lifecycle scripts:** postinstall, prepublishOnly - **Dependencies:** 12 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 4 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 12 ### Published dependency entries - @extenshi/contracts ^0.2.2 (Dependency) - @extenshi/publisher ^0.9.0 (Dependency) - @resvg/resvg-wasm 2.6.2 (Dependency) - chalk ^5.3.0 (Dependency) - commander ^12.1.0 (Dependency) - jszip ^3.10.2 (Dependency) - ora ^8.1.1 (Dependency) - parse5 ^7.3.0 (Dependency) - posthog-node ^5.60.0 (Dependency) - semver ^7.8.5 (Dependency) - undici ^7.30.1 (Dependency) - zod ^3.25.76 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @extenshi/cli - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 0.40.0 - **Version published:** 2026-11-03T19:34:24.505Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-07-17T21:57:55.625Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-11-04T12:53:22.824Z - **Known versions:** 33 - **Latest version:** 0.44.0 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Pre-publish security scanner for browser extensions - **Maintainers:** maxstone - **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20 - **Artifact files:** 391 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 4,153,784 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 1 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]()