@extenshi/mcp@0.13.0
Extenshi MCP server — bring the extension catalog (search, security, market research) and pre-publish scanning into your AI tools
AI Security Review
scanned 24d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found a consent-gated install telemetry ping and a locally launched MCP server. No source evidence established credential theft, unauthorized mutation, or another attack surface.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- package.json exposes the server through dist/index.js and runs scripts/postinstall.cjs during installation.
- The postinstall hook exits unless telemetry consent is recorded as true; it also honors opt-out and CI guards.
- The hook sends install metadata and an anonymous identifier to the configured telemetry host; it does not read or transmit an API session credential.
- dist/development-guide.js contains developer documentation URLs and service descriptions, with no reviewer-directed instructions in the inspected excerpt.
- The runtime entrypoint loads configuration and initializes telemetry before registering MCP tools.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/mcp@0.13.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/mcp@0.13.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.