@extenshi/mcp@0.13.1
Extenshi MCP server — bring the extension catalog (search, security, market research) and pre-publish scanning into your AI tools
AI Security Review
scanned 20d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiSource inspection found an install-time telemetry hook, but it exits unless the shared configuration records affirmative consent. Runtime tools use the package's fixed service endpoints, and MCP analytics filters tool content; no concrete attack behavior was established.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest defines a postinstall hook that runs the package's telemetry script.
- The install script exits unless the shared config records an affirmative telemetry choice.
- When enabled, the install event contains an anonymous install identifier and coarse package and runtime details.
- The MCP server registers tools for client requests and uses fixed Extenshi service endpoints.
- MCP analytics removes tool arguments, results, intent, and error messages before sending events.
- The development guide describes extension development and reference tools.
- The postinstall hook can send an install event over the network, but the inspected code requires recorded telemetry consent first.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L30Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/mcp@0.13.1.
See all versions of @extenshi/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/mcp@0.13.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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