@extenshi/mcp@0.5.1
Extenshi MCP server — bring the extension catalog (search, security, market research) and pre-publish scanning into your AI tools
AI Security Review
scanned 3mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe lifecycle hook is a consent-gated PostHog ping and package-owned config update, not a foreign control-surface mutation. Runtime credential, file, and network operations implement declared MCP features and require startup or explicit tool invocation.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- postinstall conditionally sends an install telemetry event.
- Runtime loads an API key from environment, .env, or Extenshi config.
- scan_extension uploads only the artifact path supplied to that MCP tool.
- No shelling, eval, payload download, destructive operation, or AI-client configuration mutation was found.
- Install telemetry exits unless ~/.extenshi/config.json records telemetry: true.
- Postinstall writes only an anonymous ID into the package's own Extenshi config.
- Network destinations are compiled-in Extenshi/PostHog services or npm registry update checking.
- Artifact scanning and store publishing are explicit MCP tool actions.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L29Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/mcp@0.5.1.
See all versions of @extenshi/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/mcp@0.5.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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