@extenshi/mcp@0.6.0
Extenshi MCP server — bring the extension catalog (search, security, market research) and pre-publish scanning into your AI tools
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe automatic telemetry and home-directory persistence create a concrete privacy risk deserving a warning. The observed guards and absence of payload execution or broad mutation do not support a malware verdict.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall script automatically.
- Postinstall reads and can update a home-directory Extenshi configuration file, then sends an installation event to PostHog.
- Runtime telemetry is enabled unless an opt-out condition is present and can create a persistent anonymous identifier.
- The postinstall network event is gated on an existing configuration value of telemetry being true.
- No self-dependency, shell execution, eval, or broad AI-client configuration mutation was found.
- The MCP server's network calls and artifact upload are tied to its stated catalog, documentation, scan, and publishing functions.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L29Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/mcp@0.6.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/mcp@0.6.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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