@extenshi/mcp@0.7.0
Extenshi MCP server — bring the extension catalog (search, security, market research) and pre-publish scanning into your AI tools
AI Security Review
scanned 26d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiInspected source shows conditional, consent-gated install telemetry, ordinary docs fetching, and runtime telemetry with opt-out checks. The scanner’s lifecycle and network signals are explained by these package functions; no concrete attack surface was found.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The package runs a postinstall script, which gates its telemetry on a recorded positive consent setting.
- The install ping sends anonymous install metadata to a PostHog endpoint; its host can be configured through the environment.
- The docs module fetches documentation for its search function.
- Runtime telemetry has opt-out checks, and the service endpoints are compiled into the config module.
- The install hook skips non-node_modules installs and CI, and exits without sending unless config records telemetry as true.
- No credential harvesting, unrelated control-surface mutation, or payload execution was identified in the inspected source.
Source & flagged code
4 flaggedPackage defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkgInstall-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgPackage source references dynamic require/import behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L29Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @extenshi/mcp@0.7.0.
See all versions of @extenshi/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @extenshi/mcp@0.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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