registry / @exulu/backend / 3.7.3
@exulu/backend@3.7.3
**Exulu IMP** (Intelligence Management Platform) is an open-source TypeScript framework for building production-ready AI agent applications. It provides the backend infrastructure for managing agents, semantic search contexts, background job processing, a
AI Security Review
scanned 2mo ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package is not conclusively malicious, but its runtime bootstrapper provides a broad agent-extension lifecycle capability. The automatic install hook is separately limited to local Python setup and does not establish a malicious chain.
Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
A running backend receives a request for the bootstrap archive, followed by a user or agent installing and running its helper.
Impact
Downloaded skills may extend the behavior of configured AI-agent clients and are fetched from the configured backend.
Mechanism
Runtime-generated multi-client agent-skill bootstrapper.
AI rationale
The package is not conclusively malicious, but its runtime bootstrapper provides a broad agent-extension lifecycle capability. The automatic install hook is separately limited to local Python setup and does not establish a malicious chain.
Evidence
dist/index.jspackage.jsonscripts/postinstall.cjs.agents/skills.claude/skills.windsurf/skills.continue/skills~/.config/imp/skills.json
Network endpoints1
<base_url>/api/skills/install.sh
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 83.0% confidence as Dangerous Capability with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- The runtime exposes a bootstrap endpoint that creates a downloadable agent-skill archive.
- The generated bootstrap targets multiple AI-agent skill directories and offers installation and update commands.
- An automatic postinstall runs a shell-based Python environment setup.
Evidence against
- The postinstall invokes only the package's local Python setup script and can be skipped or is disabled in CI.
- No runtime dependency on @exulu/backend is declared, so no nested self-lifecycle chain was found.
- The ai.open.de reference is an example placeholder in generated instructions, not a fixed credential endpoint.
- No install-time credential harvesting, external agent-directory mutation, or secret exfiltration was confirmed.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShell
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
NoLicenseWildcardDependency
Source & flagged code
11 flaggedpackage.jsonView file
•scripts.preinstall = node -e "if (process.version !== 'v22.18.0') { console.error('❌ Wrong Node.js version. Expected v22.18.0, got ' + process.version); process.exit(1); }"
Critical
Red Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script matches a deterministic static-gate block pattern.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
High
Install Time Lifecycle Scripts
Package defines install-time lifecycle scripts.
package.jsonView on unpkg•scripts.postinstall = node scripts/postinstall.cjs
Medium
Ambiguous Install Lifecycle Script
Install-time lifecycle script is not statically allowlisted and needs review.
package.jsonView on unpkgbin/backend.cjsView file
9L10: const { spawn } = require('child_process');
L11: const { existsSync } = require('fs');
High
dist/index.jsView file
23632import { fileURLToPath } from "url";
L23633: var execAsync = promisify(exec);
L23634: function getPackageRoot2() {
High
•Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
(req.headers["authorization"] || req.headers["x-api-key"]) ?? ""
const { baseUrl, authHeaders } = resolveLiteLLMTarget();
const endpoint = `${baseUrl}/v1/embeddings`;
// Optional attribution target for API keys (type "api"): tags requests
Some tools collect credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens) through a secure form shown directly to the user in the chat UI. Credentials are never entered in the conversation itse...
if (output && typeof output === "object" && output.oauth?.authorizationUrl) {
read them with the readFile tool. Files you produce yourself (via writeFile or via shell
this request (readFile, writeFile, bas
High
Credential Redirect Persistence
Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg105var redisServer = {
L106: host: process.env.REDIS_HOST ?? "",
L107: port: process.env.REDIS_PORT ?? "",
...
L372: };
L373: var resolveLiteLLMConfigPath = () => process.env.LITELLM_CONFIG_PATH ?? resolve(process.cwd(), "./config.litellm.yaml");
L374: var parseEmbeddingModels = (configPath) => {
...
L530: contentType: type,
L531: metadata: {
L532: ...metadata,
...
L572: const text = this.encoder.decode(tokens);
L573: return new TextDecoder().decode(text);
L574: }
High
Command Output Exfiltration
Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L105105var redisServer = {
L106: host: process.env.REDIS_HOST ?? "",
L107: port: process.env.REDIS_PORT ?? "",
...
L372: };
L373: var resolveLiteLLMConfigPath = () => process.env.LITELLM_CONFIG_PATH ?? resolve(process.cwd(), "./config.litellm.yaml");
L374: var parseEmbeddingModels = (configPath) => {
...
L530: contentType: type,
L531: metadata: {
L532: ...metadata,
...
L572: const text = this.encoder.decode(tokens);
L573: return new TextDecoder().decode(text);
L574: }
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L105ee/python/setup.shView file
•path = ee/python/setup.sh
kind = build_helper
sizeBytes = 10741
magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Build Helper
Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files.
ee/python/setup.shView on unpkgee/python/transcription/tests/test_server.pyView file
•path = ee/python/transcription/tests/test_server.py
kind = payload_in_excluded_dir
sizeBytes = 3264
magicHex = [redacted]
High
Payload In Excluded Dir
Package hides binary, compressed, or executable-looking payloads in test/fixture/hidden paths.
ee/python/transcription/tests/test_server.pyView on unpkgdist/chunk-BNTL6LYY.jsView file
•stage = ast_semantic_analysis; reason = ast_alias_growth_limit_exceeded; limitedFiles = 4
High
Semantic Analysis Limited
A bounded semantic-analysis stage reached its safety limit; remaining detectors completed, but this package requires AI review.
dist/chunk-BNTL6LYY.jsView on unpkgFindings
1 Critical7 High6 Medium7 Low
CriticalRed Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
HighInstall Time Lifecycle Scriptspackage.json
HighChild Processbin/backend.cjs
HighShelldist/index.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/index.js
HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/index.js
HighPayload In Excluded Diree/python/transcription/tests/test_server.py
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/chunk-BNTL6LYY.js
MediumAmbiguous Install Lifecycle Scriptpackage.json
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Build Helperee/python/setup.sh
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
MediumWildcard Dependency
LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/index.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @exulu/backend@3.7.3.
See all versions of @exulu/backend for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @exulu/backend@3.7.3 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
Think this verdict is wrong? Dispute it on GitHub or read how reports are produced.