@finchagentic/mcp@4.7.0
The runtime layer for Agentic AI. Persistent memory, autonomous agents, and workflows that survive every session.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe package forwards configured third-party API keys to its backend without clearly disclosing that they accompany general backend requests. The setup wizard does ask users to configure keys for Finch features, so the evidence supports a warning for insufficiently bounded credential forwarding rather than a confident malicious verdict.
Static reason
No blocking static signals were detected.; previous stored version diff introduced dangerous source
Trigger
A Finch backend request occurs while one or more provider API keys are present in the environment.
Impact
The Finch backend receives third-party credentials even when the request is not itself an LLM call, allowing use beyond the provider-specific routing users may expect.
Mechanism
`dist/convex.js` adds each configured provider key to an `X-User-*` header; requests default to the Finch Convex host.
AI rationale
The package forwards configured third-party API keys to its backend without clearly disclosing that they accompany general backend requests. The setup wizard does ask users to configure keys for Finch features, so the evidence supports a warning for insufficiently bounded credential forwarding rather than a confident malicious verdict.
Evidence
dist/convex.jsdist/cli.jsdist/agent-loop.js
Network endpoints2
valuable-fish-533.convex.siteapi.anthropic.com
Decision evidence
public snapshotAI called this Suspicious at 89.0% confidence as Unknown with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for warning
- `dist/convex.js` copies configured Anthropic, OpenAI, Grok and Bankr keys from environment variables into `X-User-*` request headers.
- The default backend receiving those requests is `https://valuable-fish-533.convex.site`, unless `FINCH_CONVEX_URL` overrides it.
- The setup wizard lets users provide a provider key for Finch shell and MCP calls, but does not disclose that configured keys are attached to backend requests generally.
- The agent loop also sends an Anthropic key directly to `api.anthropic.com`, consistent with the package's provider-routing function.
Evidence against
- The setup wizard makes provider keys optional and prompts users to choose a provider and enter its key.
- Provider keys have an apparent intended use for Finch's LLM features, and the agent loop routes an Anthropic key to Anthropic's own API.
Behavioral surface
ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
HighEntropyStrings
Source & flagged code
6 flaggeddist/local-vault.jsView file
68// vault handlers already catch and format that).
L69: const VAULT_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), ".finch", "vault");
L70: // Local vault is enabled purely by config - it needs no server, just the
...
L89: const raw = fs.readFileSync(indexPath(cfg), "utf8");
L90: const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
L91: return { entries: parsed.entries ?? {}, links: parsed.links ?? [] };
...
L175: agentId: input.agentId, tags, pinned: false, currentVersion: 1,
L176: createdAt: ts, updatedAt: ts, metadata: input.metadata,
L177: versions: [{ version: 1, commitMsg: input.commitMsg, agentId: input.agentId, size: Buffer.byteLength(input.content), createdAt: ts }],
Low
Weak Crypto
Package source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/local-vault.jsView on unpkg · L68dist/agent-loop.jsView file
30async function runAgent(userMessage, history, onToolCall) {
L31: const provider = process.env.FINCH_PROVIDER?.toLowerCase().trim();
L32: const bankrKey = process.env.BANKR_API_KEY;
...
L144: const sendTurn = async (messages, tools) => {
L145: const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", {
L146: method: "POST",
...
L151: },
L152: body: JSON.stringify({ model, max_tokens: 4096, system: SYSTEM_PROMPT, tools, messages }),
L153: signal: AbortSignal.timeout(90000),
...
L155: if (!res.ok) {
L156: const body = await res.text().catch(() => "");
L157: throw new Error(`Anthropic ${res.status}: ${body.slice(0, 300)}`);
Findings
1 Critical4 High2 Medium5 Low
CriticalPrevious Version Dangerous Deltadist/server.js
HighCredential Exfiltrationdist/agent-loop.js
HighCredential Redirect Persistencedist/cli.js
HighTrigger Reachable Credential Exfiltrationdist/agent-loop.js
HighSemantic Analysis Limiteddist/agent-loop.js#virtual:normalized:round1
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
LowScripts Present
LowWeak Cryptodist/local-vault.js
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @finchagentic/mcp@4.7.0.
See all versions of @finchagentic/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @finchagentic/mcp@4.7.0 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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