@finchagentic/mcp@4.7.1
The runtime layer for Agentic AI. Persistent memory, autonomous agents, and workflows that survive every session.
AI Security Review
scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-aiThe flagged credential flows use provider-specific endpoints consistent with this agent package, while the custom endpoint requires user input in setup. The reviewed manifest has no install hooks, and I found no evidence of unrelated automatic credential exfiltration.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- The manifest routes the package entrypoints to dist/index.js and the finch command to dist/cli.js; it declares no install lifecycle hooks.
- LLM credentials are selected for provider calls, and the Anthropic agent loop sends its key to api.anthropic.com.
- The custom OpenAI-compatible endpoint and its API key are collected through an explicit setup choice, and the CLI says requests will route to the entered URL.
- Bankr credentials are sent to the declared Bankr endpoint.
- The package provides an autonomous agent and LLM tools, so provider API calls are consistent with its purpose.
- No reviewed credential flow showed an unrelated fixed destination or automatic install-time collection.
Source & flagged code
6 flaggedPackage source references weak cryptographic algorithms.
dist/local-vault.jsView on unpkg · L68Findings
Affected versions and remediation
This report applies to @finchagentic/mcp@4.7.1.
See all versions of @finchagentic/mcp for other recorded verdicts.
- Review the evidence and your use of @finchagentic/mcp@4.7.1 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.
Evidence last updated: .
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