--- canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@gabrielhicks/solv" markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@gabrielhicks/solv/v/5.8.44.md" package: "@gabrielhicks/solv" report_status: "published" title: "@gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.44 npm security report" verdict: "suspicious" version: "5.8.44" --- # @gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.44 npm security report > **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document. ## Verdict summary **Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 24 finding(s) warrant review before installing. - **Verdict:** Suspicious - **Product-default install policy:** Warn - **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list - **Public report status:** Published - **Threat category:** None published - **Selected version:** 5.8.44 - **Selected version is latest:** No - **Analysis source:** AI Security Review (lpm-firewall-ai) The AI recommended clean. Static policy retained a warning. The static scanner classified the package as malicious with confidence of at least 85%. A critical static finding has confidence of at least 90%. These conditions do not mean that the AI confirmed malicious behavior. AI assessment: clean; recommendation: mark clean. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy. No unconsented install-time or import-time attack surface was identified. The package is a validator-management CLI whose operational actions require command invocation. ## Latest scan - **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1 - **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious - **Recorded analysis confidence:** 84.0% - **Started:** 2026-09-28T10:15:48.996Z - **Finished:** 2026-09-28T10:16:36.873Z - **Download time:** 1271 ms - **Static scan time:** 1144 ms - **AI review time:** 45461 ms - **Total time:** 47877 ms The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs. ## Security analysis ### Published attack-surface review - **Summary:** No unconsented install-time or import-time attack surface was identified. The package is a validator-management CLI whose operational actions require command invocation. - **Trigger:** A user runs a solv command and selects relevant options. - **Impact:** No confirmed malicious behavior was established; the remote installer is an explicit operational capability. - **Review source:** ai\_review - **Reviewed:** 2026-09-28T10:16:36.873Z ### AI review details - **Review stage:** source\_first\_review - **Mechanism:** The CLI parses process arguments and dispatches command actions; one installer option can invoke a remote installer. - **Rationale:** No lifecycle hook or automatic malicious execution was found. The remote shell installer is a user-invoked validator setup capability, not a confirmed covert attack. ### Review decision - **Verdict:** Clean - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Recommended action:** mark\_clean - **Intent class:** Benign - **False-positive risk:** Low - **Final policy explanation:** The AI recommended clean. Static policy retained a warning. The static scanner classified the package as malicious with confidence of at least 85%. A critical static finding has confidence of at least 90%. These conditions do not mean that the AI confirmed malicious behavior. - **Evidence for AI clean decision:** Package metadata exposes a CLI and contains no install lifecycle hook., The entry point parses command-line arguments before executing CLI actions., Remote installer execution is contained in an installer function, while installation options are command actions. - **Evidence against:** A user-invoked installer path downloads and executes a remote GitHub installer through a shell. ## Affected versions and remediation This report applies to @gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.44. - Review the evidence and your use of @gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.44 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report. - Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe. ## Public findings ### 1. Low: Scripts Present - **Category:** Manifest - **Confidence:** 100.0% Package declares npm scripts. ### 2. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package contains a possible secret pattern. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 6797 ``` ### 3. High: Child Process - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references child process execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... ``` ### 4. High: Shell - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 85.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Package source references shell execution. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... ``` ### 5. Medium: Network - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references network APIs. ### 6. Medium: Environment Vars - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% Package source references environment variables. ### 7. Medium: Install Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source writes installer persistence such as shell profile or service configuration. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: L6156: $ solv jupiter --help`))},"jupiterAPISetup"),En=DS;import{spa ``` ### 8. Low: Filesystem - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 70.0% Package source references filesystem APIs. ### 9. Critical: Same File Env Network Execution - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution with blocking evidence. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... ``` ### 10. High: Credential Redirect Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration. dist/index.js: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... _ _`;await A_(M)}else{let P=`**${T}** failed to catch up after update`;await A_(P)}return d}return!0},"autoUpdate"),Pi=Ca;import{homedir as da}from"os";import{readFile as la,writeF... `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let ``` ### 11. High: Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 82.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ``` ### 12. Critical: Wallet Drain - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source uses private key material to transfer cryptocurrency funds. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: L6156: $ solv jupiter --help`))},"jupiterAPISetup"),En=DS;import{spa ``` ### 13. Critical: Download Execute - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source downloads or fetches remote code and executes it. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: L6156: $ solv jupiter --help`))},"jupiterAPISetup"),En=DS;import{spa ``` ### 14. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 84.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: L6156: $ solv jupiter --help`))},"jupiterAPISetup"),En=DS;import{spa ``` ### 15. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 90.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: L6156: $ sol ``` ### 16. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ``` ### 17. High: Trigger Reachable Persistence - **Category:** Source - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches persistence behavior. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript Trigger-reachable persistence chain: scripts.start -> dist/index.js L1: #!/usr/bin/env node L2: var uT=Object.defineProperty;var E=(_,e)=>uT(_,"name",{value:e,configurable:!0}),pT=(_=>typeof require<"u"?require:typeof Proxy<"u"?new Proxy(_,{get:(e,t)=>(typeof require<"u"?requ... L3: Please set DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL in .env`);let t={content:_,username:"\u{1FA84} Solv Notifier"};return(await ea(e.DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL,{method:"POST",body:JSON.stringify(t),headers:{"... L4: Account: ${s.pubkey} ... L5797: at the NOTICE level to the logger. E.g. for a typical fd_log L5798: `;return{filePath:_,body:e}},"modDiff"),vt=ha;var Ht=E(async(_,e,t=!1)=>{let o=_.NETWORK===O.TESTNET,i=e||(o?le:w_),n=t||_.MOD,{filePath:s,body:r}=vt();n?(H("git -C /home/solv/fire... L5799: exec agave-validator \\ ... L6155: ``` ### 18. Low: High Entropy Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 55.0% Package source contains high-entropy string patterns. ### 19. Low: Url Strings - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 65.0% Package source contains URL literals. ### 20. Medium: Ships Build Helper - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 70.0% - **Path:** dist/cli/monitoring/scripts/output\_validator\_measurements.py - **Public source:** [View source]() Package ships non-JavaScript build or shell helper files. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```python path = dist/cli/monitoring/scripts/output_validator_measurements.py kind = build_helper sizeBytes = 172 magicHex = [redacted] ``` ### 21. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review - **Category:** Artifact Inventory - **Confidence:** 100.0% Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean. ### 22. High: Known Malware Source Similarity - **Category:** Static - **Confidence:** 97.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source file is highly similar to a previously finalized malicious package; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = normalized_sha256 matchedPackage = @gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.42 matchedPath = dist/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGdhYnJpZWxoaWNrcy9zb2x2:5.8.42 similarity = 1.000 summary = normalized source hash matched finalized malicious source ``` ### 23. High: Known Malware Source Fingerprint Signature - **Category:** Supply Chain - **Confidence:** 94.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Source fingerprint signature matches a known malicious package signature; route for source-aware review. Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript matchType = malicious_source_fingerprint_signature signature = 4dd710405c1f0eb8 signatureType = suspicious_hashes sourceLabel = final_verdict:malicious matchedPackage = @gabrielhicks/solv@5.8.42 matchedPath = dist/index.js matchedIdentity = npm:QGdhYnJpZWxoaWNrcy9zb2x2:5.8.42 similarity = 1.000 shingleOverlap = 1 summary = package final verdict is malicious ``` ### 24. Medium: Secret Pattern - **Category:** Secrets - **Confidence:** 75.0% - **Path:** dist/index.js - **Public source:** [View source]() Hardcoded password in dist/index.js Public source snippet (untrusted): ```javascript patternName = generic_password severity = medium line = 6824 ``` ## Dependencies and install lifecycle - **Lifecycle scripts present:** No - **Dependencies:** 21 - **Optional dependencies:** 0 - **Peer dependencies:** 0 - **Development dependencies:** 22 - **Published dependency-graph edges:** 21 ### Published dependency entries - @jup-ag/api 6.0.27 (Dependency) - @metaplex-foundation/mpl-token-metadata 3.2.1 (Dependency) - @metaplex-foundation/umi 0.9.2 (Dependency) - @metaplex-foundation/umi-bundle-defaults 0.9.2 (Dependency) - @skeet-framework/utils 1.3.11 (Dependency) - @solana/spl-stake-pool 1.1.5 (Dependency) - @solana/spl-token 0.4.8 (Dependency) - @solana/web3.js 1.98.4 (Dependency) - bigint-buffer 1.1.5 (Dependency) - bn.js 5.2.1 (Dependency) - bs58 6.0.0 (Dependency) - chalk 5.3.0 (Dependency) - chalk-pipe 6.1.0 (Dependency) - cli-progress 3.12.0 (Dependency) - cli-spinner 0.2.10 (Dependency) - cli-table3 0.6.5 (Dependency) - commander 12.1.0 (Dependency) - dotenv 16.4.5 (Dependency) - inquirer 10.2.0 (Dependency) - node-fetch 3.3.2 (Dependency) - prompt 1.3.0 (Dependency) ## Package metadata - **Package:** @gabrielhicks/solv - **Ecosystem:** npm - **Version:** 5.8.44 - **License:** Apache-2.0 - **Version published:** 2026-09-21T15:05:21.454Z - **Package first seen:** 2026-06-30T22:52:35.179Z - **Package last seen:** 2026-10-02T00:15:12.495Z - **Known versions:** 9 - **Latest version:** 5.8.45 - **Appeal under review:** No - **Description:** Solana Validator CLI SOLV - **Author:** ELSOUL LABO B.V. - **Maintainers:** gabrielhicks - **Keywords:** solana, validator, cli, validator-tool, Node.js, web3 - **Artifact files:** 24 - **Artifact unpacked size:** 1,700,607 bytes - **Artifact signatures:** 2 - **Attestations:** No ## References - [HTML security report]() - [Repository]()