AI Security Review
scanned 8h ago · by lpm-firewall-aiReview flagged AI-agent configuration or capability changes. This remains warn-only unless evidence shows foreign-agent hijack through preinstall/install/postinstall, hidden persistence, exfiltration, remote code execution, or other concrete malicious behavior.
Decision evidence
public snapshot- `dist/index.js` runs `init` to copy packaged templates into detected `~/.claude`, `~/.codex`, or `~/.cursor` workspaces.
- Without `--agents` or `--dir`, `resolveAgentTargets` auto-detects agent directories and falls back to `~/.claude`.
- `dist/index.js` stores an authorization token in `~/.genex/env` and uses it for Genex API calls.
- The explicit `publish` path can run `npm run build` and upload collected project output to a server-provided upload URL.
- `package.json` has no preinstall, install, postinstall, or other lifecycle hook.
- Agent-workspace writes occur only through the user-invoked `genex init` command, not at install or import time.
- Deploy collection excludes `.env`, `.env.*`, `.genex`, `.git`, and `node_modules`, reducing credential-upload risk.
- Network requests target configured Genex API/auth endpoints, npm registry update checks, and Sentry telemetry; no hidden payload loader or arbitrary remote code execution was found.
- No `eval`, `vm`, native loader, destructive filesystem routine, or stealth persistence behavior was found.
Source & flagged code
4 flagged · loading sourceSource appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L13A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L13This package version adds a dangerous source file absent from the previous stored version; route for source-aware review.
dist/index.jsView on unpkg