---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@gigabuddy/agent/v/0.2.37"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@gigabuddy/agent/v/0.2.37.md"
package: "@gigabuddy/agent"
report_status: "published"
title: "@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.2.37"
---

# @gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 14 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.2.37
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

Static inspection supports a warning for forwarding existing service credentials to an unrestricted configured API endpoint. No concrete malware behavior or block-eligible install mutation was identified.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 94.0%
- **Started:** 2026-09-30T22:01:38.713Z
- **Finished:** 2026-09-30T22:03:20.819Z
- **Download time:** 760 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1741 ms
- **AI review time:** 99604 ms
- **Total time:** 102106 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** A custom API URL can receive bearer credentials derived from an existing Gigabuddy session. This is conditional credential exposure; no confirmed malicious attack was established.

- **Trigger:** Start the CLI with a custom --api-url while authenticated, then invoke connect or another authenticated API operation.

- **Impact:** An operator-configured recipient could obtain a Gigabuddy bearer token.

- **Evidence paths:** agent-cli.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-09-30T22:03:20.819Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** Stored credentials authenticate against their saved authentication service, but the resulting bearer token is attached to requests targeting the independently configured API URL without a destination allowlist.

- **Rationale:** Static inspection supports a warning for forwarding existing service credentials to an unrestricted configured API endpoint. No concrete malware behavior or block-eligible install mutation was identified.

- **Network endpoints:** https://api.gigabuddy.com, https://auth.gigabuddy.com

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 94.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** The manifest exposes agent-cli.js as the CLI and declares no install lifecycle hooks., The CLI accepts an unrestricted API URL override and passes it to the active server configuration., The CLI loads stored refresh credentials and creates a token provider using their saved authentication URL., The API client sends the resulting bearer token to its configured API URL., The connect flow uses this token provider when requesting available installations.

- **Evidence against:** Default API and authentication endpoints belong to Gigabuddy., The endpoint override requires explicit CLI configuration; no covert credential export was identified., The flagged Claude integration reads session metadata rather than mutating agent configuration.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37.

- Review the evidence and your use of @gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. High: Child Process
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

Package source references child process execution.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L105: `,i),s=-1;if(r!==-1&&o!==-1?s=Math.min(r,o):r!==-1?r===t.length-1?s=-1:s=r:o!==-1&&(s=o),s===-1){n=t.slice(i);break}else{let a=t.slice(i,s);e.push(a),i=s+1,t[i-1]==="\r"&&t[i]===`
L106: `&&i++}}return[e,n]}var Cf=class extends TransformStream{constructor({onError:e,onRetry:n,onComment:i}={}){let r;super({start(o){r=LC({onEvent:s=>{o.enqueue(s)},onError(s){e==="ter...
L107: `)){let i=/^\s*\/\/([^=\s]+?)\/:_authToken\s*=\s*(\S+)\s*$/.exec(n);if(!i)continue;let r=m_(i[2]);r?.userId?.startsWith("user:")&&e.push({host:i[1],principal:r})}return e}function ...
```

### 2. High: Shell
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%

Package source references shell execution.

### 3. Low: Eval
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 45.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

Package source references a known benign dynamic code generation pattern.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
L6: || ${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null`).assign(a,(0,he._)`[${r}]`)}}}function SD({gen:t,parentData:e,parentDataProperty:n},i){t.if((0,he._)`${e} !== undefined`,()=>t.assign((0,he....
L7: missingProperty: ${i},
```

### 4. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 5. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 6. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 7. High: Same File Env Network Execution
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 85.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
L6: || ${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null`).assign(a,(0,he._)`[${r}]`)}}}function SD({gen:t,parentData:e,parentDataProperty:n},i){t.if((0,he._)`${e} !== undefined`,()=>t.assign((0,he....
L7: missingProperty: ${i},
...
L12: `&&(r&&q$(r)&&(i+=W$(r)),o&&(i+=H$(o)))}return i},Az=/\r?\n/;function Ui(t,e,n){return String(t).normalize().split(Az).map(i=>Rz(i,e,n)).join(`
L13: `)}var Ts=dl(Bh(),1);import{ReadStream as K$}from"node:tty";var jz=["up","down","left","right","space","enter","cancel"],Dz=["January","February","March","April","May","June","July...
L14:
```

### 8. High: Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 82.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: var fz=Object.create;var Fh=Object.defineProperty;var hz=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var mz=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var gz=Object.getPrototypeOf,yz=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: `:""},this._extScope=e,this._scope=new gn.Scope({parent:e}),this._nodes=[new bb]}toString(){return this._root.render(this.opts)}name(e){return this._scope.name(e)}scopeName(e){retu...
L4: || (${s} == "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r})`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"integer":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
L6: || ${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null`).assign(a,(0,he._)`[${r}]`)}}}function
```

### 9. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: var fz=Object.create;var Fh=Object.defineProperty;var hz=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var mz=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var gz=Object.getPrototypeOf,yz=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: `:""},this._extScope=e,this._scope=new gn.Scope({parent:e}),this._nodes=[new bb]}toString(){return this._root.render(this.opts)}name(e){return this._scope.name(e)}scopeName(e){retu...
L4: || (${s} == "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r})`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"integer":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
L6: || ${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null`).assign(a,(0,he._)`[${r}]`)}}}function
```

### 10. High: Obfuscated Payload Loader
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 86.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

Source contains an obfuscated payload loader that reconstructs and executes hidden code.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L2: var fz=Object.create;var Fh=Object.defineProperty;var hz=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var mz=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var gz=Object.getPrototypeOf,yz=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: `:""},this._extScope=e,this._scope=new gn.Scope({parent:e}),this._nodes=[new bb]}toString(){return this._root.render(this.opts)}name(e){return this._scope.name(e)}scopeName(e){retu...
L4: || (${s} == "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r})`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"integer":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
L6: || ${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null`).assign(a,(0,he._)`[${r}]`)}}}function
```

### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Command Output Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** agent-cli.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@gigabuddy/agent@0.2.37/agent-cli.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches command-output exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable command-output exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> agent-cli.js
L2: var fz=Object.create;var Fh=Object.defineProperty;var hz=Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;var mz=Object.getOwnPropertyNames;var gz=Object.getPrototypeOf,yz=Object.prototype.hasOwnPr...
L3: `:""},this._extScope=e,this._scope=new gn.Scope({parent:e}),this._nodes=[new bb]}toString(){return this._root.render(this.opts)}name(e){return this._scope.name(e)}scopeName(e){retu...
L4: || (${s} == "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r})`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"integer":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${s} === "boolean" || ${r} === null
L5: || (${s} === "string" && ${r} && ${r} == +${r} && !(${r} % 1))`).assign(a,(0,he._)`+${r}`);return;case"boolean":i.elseIf((0,he._)`${r} === "false" || ${r} === 0 || ${r} === null`)....
```

### 12. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 13. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** No

- **Dependencies:** 0
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 0
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 0

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @gigabuddy/agent
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.2.37
- **License:** MIT
- **Version published:** 2026-09-30T22:00:04.572Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-13T15:42:23.846Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T11:26:03.477Z
- **Known versions:** 48
- **Latest version:** 0.2.69
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** The Gigabuddy agent client — connects a coding-agent session to Gigabuddy places: presence, messaging, and the hosted tool door.
- **Maintainers:** dr0ne, virginiamurdoch
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=20
- **Artifact files:** 4
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 967,611 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@gigabuddy/agent/v/0.2.37>)
- [Homepage](<https://gigabuddy.com/>)
