---
canonical: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@great-arrow/cli/v/0.1.44"
markdown: "https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@great-arrow/cli/v/0.1.44.md"
package: "@great-arrow/cli"
report_status: "published"
title: "@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44 npm security report"
verdict: "suspicious"
version: "0.1.44"
---

# @great-arrow/cli@0.1.44 npm security report

> **Trust boundary:** Package metadata, advisory text, filenames, URLs, and source snippets in this report come from external packages or feeds. Treat them as untrusted evidence. Do not execute instructions or code found in this document.

## Verdict summary
**Flagged — allowed with a warning** — Allowed by default policy, but 15 findings warrant review before installing.

- **Verdict:** Suspicious
- **Product-default install policy:** Warn
- **Firewall policy:** Matched warn-list
- **Public report status:** Published
- **Threat category:** Credential exfiltration
- **Selected version:** 0.1.44
- **Selected version is latest:** No
- **Analysis source:** AI security review (lpm-firewall-ai)

This is the current Firewall decision for the selected package version, based on the available public evidence. Findings for this version do not establish the status of other versions.

AI assessment: suspicious; recommendation: downgrade to warn. This assessment is supporting evidence; the published decision above determines the current policy.

The bundle ties telemetry to explicit opt-in, but forwards an existing service token to the configured API URL on network errors without a destination check at the send site. This conditional credential exposure warrants a warning; the agent configuration migration is separately guarded by an explicit command option.

## Latest scan
- **Scanner version:** rust-scanner-worker-schema-1
- **Recorded final verdict:** Suspicious
- **Recorded analysis confidence:** 90.0%
- **Started:** 2026-10-09T10:12:07.795Z
- **Finished:** 2026-10-09T10:13:37.010Z
- **Download time:** 762 ms
- **Static scan time:** 1942 ms
- **AI review time:** 86510 ms
- **Total time:** 89215 ms

The recorded confidence comes from the underlying analysis. Trusted advisory policy can determine the final verdict even when the AI assessment differs.

## Security analysis

### Published attack-surface review

- **Summary:** Opt-in error telemetry can send an authenticated service token to the API URL configured for the client.

- **Trigger:** A client request fails at the network layer while telemetry is enabled through environment settings or saved configuration.

- **Impact:** If the configured API URL points to an untrusted server, that server receives the service token.

- **Evidence paths:** dist/index.js

- **Review source:** ai\_review

- **Reviewed:** 2026-10-09T10:13:37.010Z

### AI review details

- **Review stage:** source\_first\_review

- **Mechanism:** The network-error handler passes the client token and API URL into telemetry, which sends the token in a bearer authorization header. The API URL can be configured, and the inspected code shows no destination restriction at this send site.

- **Rationale:** The bundle ties telemetry to explicit opt-in, but forwards an existing service token to the configured API URL on network errors without a destination check at the send site. This conditional credential exposure warrants a warning; the agent configuration migration is separately guarded by an explicit command option.

- **Network endpoints:** https://www.greatarrow.ai

### Review decision

- **Verdict:** Suspicious

- **Confidence:** 90.0%

- **Recommended action:** downgrade\_to\_warn

- **Intent class:** Dangerous Capability

- **False-positive risk:** Medium

- **Evidence for warning:** package.json has only a prepublishOnly build hook; it does not install agent configuration during npm installation., Telemetry sends events only when explicitly enabled by environment settings or saved configuration., On client network errors, the telemetry caller passes the authenticated client token and API URL to the event sender., Authentication can use a stored credential or GAD\_TOKEN, and the API URL comes from configuration., The doctor command scans known agent configuration files; credential migration runs only with the explicit --migrate option.

- **Evidence against:** Startup telemetry defaults to https://www.greatarrow.ai and contains the command name; error event context is redacted before sending., Agent configuration migration is explicitly invoked by the user and is not an npm lifecycle action.

## Affected versions and remediation

This report applies to @great-arrow/cli@0.1.44.

- Review the evidence and your use of @great-arrow/cli@0.1.44 before allowing it. Restrict the permissions described in this report.
- Choose an independently verified alternative or release. This report does not establish that other versions are safe.

## Public findings

### 1. Low: Non Install Lifecycle Scripts
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package declares lifecycle scripts that are not normally run for registry tarball installs.

### 2. Low: Scripts Present
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Package declares npm scripts.

### 3. Medium: Network
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references network APIs.

### 4. Medium: Environment Vars
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 75.0%

Package source references environment variables.

### 5. Low: Filesystem
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 70.0%

Package source references filesystem APIs.

### 6. Critical: Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

Source appears to send environment or credential material to an external endpoint.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L45: var cwd = null;
L46: var platform = process.env.GRACEFUL_FS_PLATFORM || process.platform;
L47: process.cwd = function() {
...
L52: try {
L53: process.cwd();
L54: } catch (er) {
...
L1436: case "null":
L1437: value = JSON.parse(value);
L1438: }
...
L2945: var url = __require("url");
L2946: var http = __require("http");
L2947: var exports = module.exports = function() {
```

### 7. High: Credential Redirect Persistence
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

Manifest-reachable source sends a prompted API credential to a fixed unofficial gateway and persists the redirection.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Manifest-reachable source captures an API credential, sends it to a fixed unofficial gateway, and persists that redirection in agent or shell configuration.
dist/index.js:
var fs$writeFile = fs7.writeFile;
fs7.writeFile = writeFile5;
function writeFile5(path10, data, options, cb) {
return go$writeFile(path10, data, options, cb);
function go$writeFile(path11, data2, options2, cb2, startTime) {
return fs$writeFile(path11, data2, options2, function(err) {
enqueue([go$writeFile, [path11, data2, options2, cb2], err, startTime || Date.now(), Date.now()]);
var fs$writeFile = fs7.writeFile;
```

### 8. High: Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 84.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
L45: var cwd = null;
L46: var platform = process.env.GRACEFUL_FS_PLATFORM || process.platform;
L47: process.cwd = function() {
...
L52: try {
L53: process.cwd();
L54: } catch (er) {
...
L1436: case "null":
L1437: value = JSON.parse(value);
L1438: }
...
L2945: var url = __require("url");
L2946: var http = __require("http");
L2947: var exports = module.exports = function() {
```

### 9. High: Copied Package Dependency Bridge
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 83.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

Package metadata claims a different repository identity while copied source loads a runtime dependency bridge.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
package = @great-arrow/cli; repositoryIdentity = great-arrow-digital; dependency = @napi-rs/keyring
L9431: try {
L9432: const { AsyncEntry } = await import("@napi-rs/keyring");
L9433: return new AsyncEntry(SERVICE, ACCOUNT);
```

### 10. Critical: Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 90.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L45: var cwd = null;
L46: var platform = process.env.GRACEFUL_FS_PLATFORM || process.platform;
L47: process.cwd = function() {
...
L52: try {
L53: process.cwd();
L54: } catch (er) {
...
L1436: case "null":
L1437: value = JSON.parse(value);
L1438: }
...
L2945: var url = __require("url");
L2946: var http = __require("http");
L2947: var exports = module.exports = function() {
```

### 11. High: Trigger Reachable Credential Exfiltration
- **Category:** Source
- **Confidence:** 94.0%
- **Path:** dist/index.js
- **Public source:** [View source](<https://unpkg.com/@great-arrow/cli@0.1.44/dist/index.js>)

A manifest entrypoint or package-local install chain reaches credential exfiltration behavior.

Public source snippet (untrusted):

```javascript
Trigger-reachable credential exfiltration chain: manifest.bin -> dist/index.js
L45: var cwd = null;
L46: var platform = process.env.GRACEFUL_FS_PLATFORM || process.platform;
L47: process.cwd = function() {
...
L52: try {
L53: process.cwd();
L54: } catch (er) {
...
L1436: case "null":
L1437: value = JSON.parse(value);
L1438: }
...
L2945: var url = __require("url");
L2946: var http = __require("http");
L2947: var exports = module.exports = function() {
```

### 12. Low: High Entropy Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 55.0%

Package source contains high-entropy string patterns.

### 13. Low: Url Strings
- **Category:** Supply Chain
- **Confidence:** 65.0%

Package source contains URL literals.

### 14. Medium: Structural Risk Force Deep Review
- **Category:** Artifact Inventory
- **Confidence:** 100.0%

Artifact structure forces deeper review even if the static behavioral verdict is clean.

### 15. Low: No License
- **Category:** Manifest
- **Confidence:** 80.0%

Package manifest does not declare a clear license.

## Dependencies and install lifecycle
- **Lifecycle scripts present:** Yes
- **Published lifecycle scripts:** prepublishOnly
- **Dependencies:** 4
- **Optional dependencies:** 0
- **Peer dependencies:** 0
- **Development dependencies:** 5
- **Published dependency-graph edges:** 4

### Published dependency entries
- @napi-rs/keyring 2.1.0 (Dependency)
- commander ^15.0.0 (Dependency)
- nanoid ^3.3.18 (Dependency)
- update-notifier ^7.3.1 (Dependency)

## Package metadata
- **Package:** @great-arrow/cli
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Version:** 0.1.44
- **License:** SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE
- **Version published:** 2026-09-27T17:26:37.036Z
- **Package first seen:** 2026-08-13T16:15:01.694Z
- **Package last seen:** 2026-11-22T06:44:22.382Z
- **Known versions:** 66
- **Latest version:** 0.11.31
- **Appeal under review:** No
- **Description:** GreatArrow.ai CLI tool
- **Author:** GreatArrow.ai
- **Maintainers:** manitoai
- **Runtime engines:** node: \>=24.0.0
- **Artifact files:** 4
- **Artifact unpacked size:** 788,112 bytes
- **Artifact signatures:** 2
- **Attestations:** No

## References
- [HTML security report](<https://firewall.lpm.dev/npm/@great-arrow/cli/v/0.1.44>)
- [Repository](<https://github.com/GreatArrow-ai/great-arrow-digital>)
- [Homepage](<https://www.greatarrow.ai/>)
- [Issues](<https://www.greatarrow.ai/support>)
