@guangnao/agent-hub@1.0.5: Suspicious npm security report (Warn)

Static Scan Results

scanned 9d ago · by rust-scanner

Static analysis flagged 14 finding(s) at 72.0% confidence. This version is warn-only unless an AI or security-team review confirms malicious behavior.

Static reason

One or more suspicious static signals were detected.

Decision evidence

public snapshot

Behavioral surface

Source

ChildProcessCryptoEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetworkShellWebSocket

Supply chain

HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings

ManifestNo manifest risk signals triggered.

scanned 8 file(s), 486 KB of source, external domains: 127.0.0.1, api.anthropic.com, api.openai.com, auth.openai.com, chatgpt.com, console.anthropic.com

Source & flagged code

5 flagged

dist/index.jsView file

4577// ../agent-llm/src/process/spawn.ts L4578: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L4579: import { createInterface } from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4577

49kStatusCode: Symbol("status-code"), L50: kWebSocket: Symbol("websocket"), L51: NOOP: () => { ... L102: } else { L103: buf = Buffer.from(data); L104: toBuffer.readOnly = false; ... L114: }; L115: if (!process.env.WS_NO_BUFFER_UTIL) { L116: try { ... L166: * L167: * @private L168: */

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

dist/cli.jsView file

6183`); L6184: const r = spawnSync("pm2", ["start", script, "--name", PM2_NAME, "--kill-timeout", "8000", "--max-restarts", "10", "--", "serve"], { stdio: "inherit", env: { ...process.env, AGENT_... L6185: if (r.status !== 0) process.exit(r.status ?? 1); ... L6193: try { L6194: if ((await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1e3) })).ok) { L6195: ready = true;

High

Same File Env Network Execution

A single source file combines environment access, network access, and code or shell execution; review context before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L6183

6181const script = process.argv[1]; L6182: process.stdout.write(`\u2026 pm2 start ${script} --name ${PM2_NAME} -- serve L6183: `); L6184: const r = spawnSync("pm2", ["start", script, "--name", PM2_NAME, "--kill-timeout", "8000", "--max-restarts", "10", "--", "serve"], { stdio: "inherit", env: { ...process.env, AGENT_... L6185: if (r.status !== 0) process.exit(r.status ?? 1); ... L6193: try { L6194: if ((await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1e3) })).ok) { L6195: ready = true;

High

Command Output Exfiltration

Source combines command execution, command-output handling, and outbound requests; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L6181

50Cross-file remote execution chain: dist/cli.js spawns dist/index.js; helper contains network access plus dynamic code execution. L50: kStatusCode: Symbol("status-code"), L51: kWebSocket: Symbol("websocket"), L52: NOOP: () => { ... L103: } else { L104: buf = Buffer.from(data); L105: toBuffer.readOnly = false; ... L115: }; L116: if (!process.env.WS_NO_BUFFER_UTIL) { L117: try { ... L167: * L168: * @private L169: */

High

Cross File Remote Execution Context

Source spawns a local helper that also contains network and dynamic execution context; review data flow before blocking.

dist/cli.jsView on unpkg · L50

Source & flagged code

5 flagged · loading source

dist/index.jsView file

4577// ../agent-llm/src/process/spawn.ts L4578: import { spawn } from "node:child_process"; L4579: import { createInterface } from "node:readline";

High

Child Process

Package source references child process execution.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L4577

49kStatusCode: Symbol("status-code"), L50: kWebSocket: Symbol("websocket"), L51: NOOP: () => { ... L102: } else { L103: buf = Buffer.from(data); L104: toBuffer.readOnly = false; ... L114: }; L115: if (!process.env.WS_NO_BUFFER_UTIL) { L116: try { ... L166: * L167: * @private L168: */

High

Sandbox Evasion Gated Capability

Source gates dangerous network, credential, or execution behavior behind CI, host, platform, time, or geo fingerprint checks.

dist/index.jsView on unpkg · L49

dist/cli.jsView file

6183`); L6184: const r = spawnSync("pm2", ["start", script, "--name", PM2_NAME, "--kill-timeout", "8000", "--max-restarts", "10", "--", "serve"], { stdio: "inherit", env: { ...process.env, AGENT_... L6185: if (r.status !== 0) process.exit(r.status ?? 1); ... L6193: try { L6194: if ((await fetch(`http://${host}:${port}/health`, { signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1e3) })).ok) { L6195: ready = true;

Findings

6 High3 Medium5 Low

HighChild Processdist/index.js

HighShell

HighSame File Env Network Executiondist/cli.js

HighCommand Output Exfiltrationdist/cli.js

HighSandbox Evasion Gated Capabilitydist/index.js

HighCross File Remote Execution Contextdist/cli.js

MediumNetwork

MediumEnvironment Vars

MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review

LowNon Install Lifecycle Scripts

LowScripts Present

LowFilesystem

LowHigh Entropy Strings

LowUrl Strings