registry  /  @h-rig/harness-plugin  /  0.0.6-alpha.190

@h-rig/harness-plugin@0.0.6-alpha.190

First-party agent-harness provider capability plugin for Rig.

AI Security Review

scanned 2d ago · by lpm-firewall-ai

No confirmed malicious attack surface was established. The package is an agent-harness plugin with expected file writes, process spawning, native runtime tools, and limited user-invoked network access.

Static reason
High-risk behavior combination matched malicious policy.
Trigger
User imports/loads the Rig plugin or invokes Rig CLI/runtime commands.
Impact
Can modify Rig/agent runtime configuration and run controlled tools when explicitly used, but no unconsented install-time behavior or exfiltration was found.
Mechanism
Package-aligned agent runtime provisioning and tool materialization.
Rationale
Static inspection found high-risk primitives, but they are aligned with the declared Rig agent-harness purpose and are reached through explicit plugin capabilities or CLI/runtime entrypoints. I found no lifecycle execution, credential harvesting with exfiltration, persistence backdoor, destructive behavior, or unconsented AI-agent control-surface mutation.
Evidence
package.jsondist/src/plugin.jsdist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.jsdist/src/session-hook-materializer-service.jsdist/src/pi-command.jsdist/src/pi-settings-materializer.jsdist/src/skill-materializer.jsdist/src/tooling/shell-tools.jsnative/linux-arm64/rig-shellnative/linux-arm64/rig-tools.claude/settings.json.pi/settings.json.pi/skills/*/SKILL.md.rig/state/pi-managed-packages.json.rig/runtime/handoffs/*.jsonruntime home .ssh/known_hostsruntime bin/tool paths
Network endpoints1
registry.npmjs.org/-/v1/search

Decision evidence

public snapshot
AI called this Clean at 87.0% confidence as Benign with medium false-positive risk.
Evidence for block
  • Ships native helper binaries under native/*/rig-shell and rig-tools.
  • Runtime helpers can spawn controlled shells and materialize tool binaries when invoked.
  • Writes provider-managed runtime files such as .claude/settings.json, .pi/settings.json, .rig/state, and runtime known_hosts.
Evidence against
  • package.json has no install/preinstall/postinstall lifecycle hooks.
  • Main export dist/src/plugin.js registers a Rig provider plugin; dangerous primitives are exposed as Rig CLI/capability actions, not import-time execution.
  • Network use found is limited to npm registry search in rig pi search and run steering via caller-provided serverUrl.
  • Secret handling resolves expected runtime API keys into Rig runtime env/defines; no source exfiltration endpoint found.
  • Session hook and Pi writes are plugin/config-driven and marked/managed, preserving operator entries.
  • Native binary strings show Rig workspace/tool enforcement terms, with no obvious downloader or C2 strings.
Behavioral surface
Source
ChildProcessEnvironmentVarsFilesystemNetwork
Supply chain
HighEntropyStringsUrlStrings
Manifest
NoLicense
scanned 34 file(s), 634 KB of source, external domains: registry.npmjs.org

Source & flagged code

3 flagged · loading source
dist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.jsView file
15const candidates = [ L16: process.env.RIG_CONTROLLED_BASH_BIN?.trim() || "", L17: resolve(layout.binDir, "controlled-bash"), ... L29: async function runControlledBash(args, options) { L30: const projectRoot = process.env.RIG_HOST_PROJECT_ROOT?.trim() || process.env.PROJECT_RIG_ROOT?.trim() || process.env.RIG_TASK_WORKSPACE?.trim() || process.cwd() || options.projectR... L31: const controlled = resolveControlledBash(projectRoot); ... L38: stdin: "inherit", L39: stdout: "inherit", L40: stderr: "inherit", ... L169: try { L170: const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8")); L171: return parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : null;
Critical
Persistence Backdoor

Source writes persistence or remote-access backdoor material.

dist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.jsView on unpkg · L15
15Trigger-reachable chain: manifest.exports -> dist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.js L15: const candidates = [ L16: process.env.RIG_CONTROLLED_BASH_BIN?.trim() || "", L17: resolve(layout.binDir, "controlled-bash"), ... L29: async function runControlledBash(args, options) { L30: const projectRoot = process.env.RIG_HOST_PROJECT_ROOT?.trim() || process.env.PROJECT_RIG_ROOT?.trim() || process.env.RIG_TASK_WORKSPACE?.trim() || process.cwd() || options.projectR... L31: const controlled = resolveControlledBash(projectRoot); ... L38: stdin: "inherit", L39: stdout: "inherit", L40: stderr: "inherit", ... L169: try { L170: const parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf-8")); L171: return parsed && typeof parsed === "object" && !Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : null;
Critical
Trigger Reachable Dangerous Capability

A package entrypoint or install-time lifecycle script reaches a source file with blocking dangerous behavior.

dist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.jsView on unpkg · L15
native/linux-arm64/rig-shellView file
path = native/linux-arm64/rig-shell kind = native_binary sizeBytes = 3029392 magicHex = [redacted]
Medium
Ships Native Binary

Package ships native binary artifacts.

native/linux-arm64/rig-shellView on unpkg

Findings

2 Critical4 Medium4 Low
CriticalPersistence Backdoordist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.js
CriticalTrigger Reachable Dangerous Capabilitydist/src/agent-harness/rig-agent.js
MediumNetwork
MediumEnvironment Vars
MediumShips Native Binarynative/linux-arm64/rig-shell
MediumStructural Risk Force Deep Review
LowFilesystem
LowHigh Entropy Strings
LowUrl Strings
LowNo License